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Dear Mr President 
Dear Madam Speaker 
The Australian National Audit Office has undertaken an independent 
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medicines, vaccines,  antidotes  and protective  equipment  available  for use  as 
part of  the national  response  to a public health  emergency.  It  is  intended  to 
augment  state  and  territory  government  reserves  of  key medical  items  in  a 
health emergency, which could arise from terrorist activities or natural causes 
such as the 2009 influenza pandemic. 





3. The  Stockpile  was  originally  established  in  2002  as  part  of  the 




almost  $196  million  in  2012–13.2  The  Stockpile,  comprising  42 products  and 
over 110 million items3, is now dominated by products associated with human 
influenza pandemic preparedness.  
4. The  Department  of  Health  is  responsible  for  the  planning  and 
management  of  the  Stockpile,  while  state  and  territory  governments  are 
responsible for deploying Stockpile items within their jurisdictions in the event 
of  a  national  health  emergency.4  The  Stockpile  is  warehoused  at  facilities 
                                                     
1  The Stockpile is comprised of specialised pharmaceuticals and personal protective equipment from 
overseas suppliers. Securing an adequate supply of relevant items in the timeframes required can be a 
challenge if there is a global surge in demand, as would be the case in a pandemic.  
2  Department of Health and Ageing, Annual Report 2012–13, Audited Financial Statements, p. 349. The 
Department of Health advised in June 2014 that the value of the Stockpile in 2013–14 is approximately 
$192 million.  
3  Ernst & Young, ‘Department of Health and Ageing: National Medical Stockpile Stocktake 2012–13’, 
30 June 2013.  
4  The Department of Health has entered into Memoranda of Understanding with each state and territory 
for the receipt, storage and use of pharmaceuticals and equipment from the Stockpile.  
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effective:  stock  selection  and  procurement;  warehousing  to  maintain  the 
efficacy  of  items5;  stock‐control  to  account  for  and  locate  items;  and dealing 
with items as they reach their expiry dates.6 Unlike other inventories which are 
continually  being  recycled,  an  emergency  stockpile  is  infrequently deployed 
and significant volumes of unused goods need to be disposed of on expiry.7  
6. The  limited  shelf  life of medicines  and  equipment  and  the  long‐term 
maintenance  of  emergency  stockpiles  constitute  a  significant  cost  for 
government,  with  over  $750 million  allocated  for  the  Stockpile  in  the  past 
ten years.8  In  2011,  the Department of Finance  completed  a  strategic  review9 
which  recommended  a  number  of  significant  changes  to  Stockpile 
management,  including  a  more  commercially  focussed  ‘prime  vendor’ 
arrangement  for  outsourcing  some  management  functions  under  a  single 
contract. In September 2011, the Department of Health also finalised a review 
of  the  Australian  health  sector’s  response  to  the  2009  pandemic.  The  key 
finding  relating  to  the  Stockpile was  that while  it met  the  relatively  limited 
demands  of  the  2009  pandemic,  which  was  considered  to  be  of  moderate 
intensity, it may not meet the more intense demands of a severe pandemic. The 
review  made  25  recommendations  including  two  related  to  the  Stockpile’s 
deployment. Implementation of the Department of Finance and Health reviews 
remains ongoing. 




5  Certain items must be stored in a controlled environment.  
6  The notes to the department’s financial statements for 2012–13 indicated that $4.36 million in Stockpile 
inventory would pass its expiry date during the period July to September 2013. See Department of 
Health and Ageing, Annual Report 2012–13, p. 349.  
7  $145 million worth of stock had expired in 2010–2011. The expired stock comprised some 2,352 pallets 
in storage, the bulk of which were PPE, influenza antiviral and antibiotic. The department advised that 
the cost of storing expired stock in 2010–11 was $160 000.  
8  Department of Finance advice to the ANAO, dated 8 August 2013, based on analysis of Commonwealth 
Budget Paper 2: 2003–04 to 2013–14.  
9  Department of Finance, ‘Review of the National Medical Stockpile’, 2011.  
Summary 
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8. To  assist  in  evaluating  the department’s performance  in  terms  of  the 
audit objective, the ANAO developed the following high level criteria: 
 the Department of Health has sound governance arrangements in place 
for  the  management  of  the  Stockpile,  including  an  integrated  and 
systematic approach to risk management and performance reporting;  
 the  Department  of  Health’s  procurement  and  contract  management 
arrangements for the Stockpile demonstrate a focus on getting the right 
outcomes and achieving value for money; 
 the  Stockpile’s  inventory  management  system  reflects  value  for 






9. The ANAO did not assess processes  for  the disposal or destruction of 
expired stock.10 While  the audit examined aspects of  the deployment strategy 
for the Stockpile,  it did not seek to assess Australia’s general preparedness to 
respond  to a national health emergency. Nor did  the audit assess  the clinical 
efficacy of stockpiled items.  
10. An  ANAO  performance  audit  in  2007–08  on  Australia’s  pandemic 
preparedness concluded that the Stockpile was established without high level 
planning,  assessment  of  risks  and  an  appropriate management  framework.11 
The ANAO recommended a shift from a short term ‘supply and store’ strategy 
for the Stockpile to a longer term management strategy. The current audit was 
not  intended  to  assess  implementation  of  all  the  earlier  audit 
recommendations. However, in the course of the audit the ANAO considered 
the  extent  to  which  the  Department  of  Health  has  implemented 
recommendations relating to the Stockpile.  
                                                     
10  For example, the ANAO did not undertake control testing of the disposal or destruction of expired stock. 
The disposal of expired stock was the subject of a 2012 internal audit by the department.  
11  ANAO Performance Audit Report No.6 2007–08 Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza 
Pandemic, pp.20-21, p.99.  
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2002  represents  a  significant  government  investment  in  the  nation’s 
preparedness  for public health emergencies  resulting  from  terrorist activities 
or natural causes such as pandemics; with over $750 million allocated  for  the 
Stockpile  in  the past decade.  In 2012–13  the Stockpile comprised 42 products 
and over 110 million  items, with a reported value of almost $196 million. The 
effective  management  of  this  large  strategic  reserve,  comprising 
pharmaceuticals and personal protective  equipment with a  limited  shelf  life, 
relies  on  planning  and  administrative  arrangements  geared  to:  select  and 
procure  appropriate  items; warehouse  and  control  the  stock;  and  deal with 
expiring  items.  Effective  deployment  arrangements  are  also  required  to 
augment  state  and  territory  reserves  of  items  from  the  Stockpile  in  a  timely 
manner.  
12. Overall,  the  Department  of  Health’s  management  of  the  National 
Medical Stockpile has been generally effective in recent years, benefiting from 
improvements  introduced  since  2010.  There  remains  scope,  however,  for 
improving  the  department’s  strategic  framework,  operational  management 
and deployment arrangements for the Stockpile.  
13. Since  2007, when  the ANAO  concluded  that  the department had not 
developed  an  appropriate  framework  for  managing  the  Stockpile12,  the 
Department  of  Health  has  implemented  a  more  structured  management 
approach,  including:  the  development  of  strategic  and  operational  risk 
management  plans  in  2010;  the  rationalisation  of  previously  fragmented 
storage  contracts  in  2010;  the  application  of  an  evidence‐based  approach  for 
the  selection  of  appropriate  stockpile  items;  and  the maintenance  of  formal 
deployment arrangements with states and territories. Strategies have also been 
adopted  or  examined  for  the  cost‐effective  replenishment  and  disposal  of 
expired  stockpile  items.  However,  there  remains  scope  for  improving  key 
elements of the department’s management arrangements, including: updating 
the strategic and operational risk management plans; clarifying aspects of the 
storage  contracts  to  strengthen  reporting  and  performance  monitoring; 
improving the integrity of data used to manage the stockpile; and planning to 
                                                     
12  ANAO Performance Audit Report No.6 2007–08 Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza 
Pandemic, pp. 20–21, pp. 95–99.  
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12  ANAO Performance Audit Report No.6 2007–08 Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza 
Pandemic, pp. 20–21, pp. 95–99.  
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14. The department adopted a more  strategic approach  to  the Stockpile’s 
management with the introduction of a strategic plan in 2010, albeit some eight 
years after the Stockpile was established. While the plan broadly describes the 
governance,  funding  and  administrative  arrangements  for  the  Stockpile,  it 
should  be  updated  to  identify  objectives,  priorities  and  strategies  for  the 
Stockpile’s  management—key  elements  of  a  strategic  plan.  High  level 
outcomes for  the Stockpile agreed  to  in 2011 by  the  then Government should 
also be reflected in an updated plan.  
15. Operational  management  of  the  Stockpile  benefited  from  the 
introduction of an operational risk management plan in 2010, which should be 
updated to reflect risks identified in the Department of Finance’s 2011 Strategic 
Review  of  the  Stockpile.13  Operational  management  was  further  improved 
with  the  consolidation  of  warehousing  arrangements  into  two  longer‐term 
contracts with  logistics  firms,  relating  to pharmaceutical  items  and personal 
protective equipment. However, management reports have not been regularly 
provided, as required under  the contracts, and  the department should clarify 
reporting obligations. Further,  there  is  scope  to address weaknesses  in  some 
system  controls  and  shortcomings  in  manual  processing,  which  have 
contributed  to  the  emergence  of  data  integrity  issues  such  as  discrepancies 
between  information  held  in  the  Stockpile  database  and  warehouse  system 
records.  
16. The  department  has  developed  a  deployment  framework with  states 
and territories, although these arrangements have not been recently tested. To 
provide assurance that deployment arrangements will be effective in a national 




management of  the Stockpile, as does  the  recent  focus on  the  findings of  the 
2011 Strategic Review. The ANAO has made four recommendations aimed at 
                                                     
13  These included a lack of logistics and inventory management expertise within the Department of Health 
and shortcomings in the Stockpile’s information management systems.  
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by:  improving  strategic  planning  and  risk  management;  enhancing 
performance  reporting  by  contractors;  reviewing  information  management 
arrangements; and planning to test deployment arrangements.  
Key findings by chapter 
Strategic Framework (Chapter 2)  
18. The  ANAO’s  2007–08  audit  observed  that  the  establishment  of  the 
Stockpile in 2002 occurred without the high‐level planning, assessment of risks 
and management processes that would usually be put into place by an agency 
to  manage  policy  initiatives.  This  was  partly  due  to  the  immediacy  of  the 
Stockpile’s  formation  in an environment of rapidly changing and unexpected 
international events.  
19. The  department  developed  a  Strategic  Management  Plan  for  the 
Stockpile in 2010, eight years after the Stockpile was first established. The plan 
broadly describes  the  governance,  funding  and  administrative  arrangements 




in  March  2011,  an  important  step  towards  developing  a  more  strategic 
approach to managing the Stockpile. The department should update the 2010 
Strategic  Management  Plan  to  reflect  this  development  and  to  include 
objectives, priorities and strategies.  
20. In  its  2007–08 performance  audit,  the ANAO  also  recommended  that 
the  department  develop  a  risk  management  plan  for  the  Stockpile  that  is 
reviewed  regularly. The department’s enterprise‐level  risk management plan 
identifies one strategic risk for the Stockpile;  inadequate government funding 
to maintain  stock holdings.14 The department  also developed  an  operational 
risk management plan  for  the Stockpile  in  July 2010, which documents  risks, 





14  This was rated as a ‘high’ risk for the department.  
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international events.  
19. The  department  developed  a  Strategic  Management  Plan  for  the 
Stockpile in 2010, eight years after the Stockpile was first established. The plan 
broadly describes  the  governance,  funding  and  administrative  arrangements 




in  March  2011,  an  important  step  towards  developing  a  more  strategic 
approach to managing the Stockpile. The department should update the 2010 
Strategic  Management  Plan  to  reflect  this  development  and  to  include 
objectives, priorities and strategies.  
20. In  its  2007–08 performance  audit,  the ANAO  also  recommended  that 
the  department  develop  a  risk  management  plan  for  the  Stockpile  that  is 
reviewed  regularly. The department’s enterprise‐level  risk management plan 
identifies one strategic risk for the Stockpile;  inadequate government funding 
to maintain  stock holdings.14 The department  also developed  an  operational 
risk management plan  for  the Stockpile  in  July 2010, which documents  risks, 





14  This was rated as a ‘high’ risk for the department.  
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21. The  ANAO  further  recommended,  in  its  2007–08  audit  report,  the 
development of a performance management and reporting framework for the 
Stockpile,  to  provide  ongoing  assurance  about  the  content,  storage,  security 
and management of the Stockpile. While quarterly reports were subsequently 
prepared  for  senior management,  the department  advised  the ANAO  in  the 
course  of  the  current  audit  that  quarterly  reporting  on  the  status  of  the 
Stockpile was discontinued from April 2011 in favour of issue specific updates. 
The  department  will  need  to  exercise  judgement  that  the  revised  approach 
provides an adequate basis for senior management to assess performance.  
Procurement and Contract Management (Chapter 3) 




23. The  department  employed  a  limited  tender  process  for  18 
procurements  relating  to  the  purchase  of  pharmaceuticals,  on  the  basis  that 
there was only one organisation that manufactured or was licensed to supply 
the particular product  in Australia. While a  limited  tender approach  in  such 
circumstances  is  provided  for  in  the  Commonwealth  Procurement  Rules 
(CPRs)16,  advice  to  the  delegate  on  the  key  issue  of  value  for  money17  was 




personal  protective  equipment  (PPE)  were  conducted  through  open  tender 
                                                     
15  The Strategic Review identified a range of issues in the management of the Stockpile such as the: 
inadequacy of the information management system for accurate recording and reporting on the 
Stockpile’s inventory; lack of logistical and inventory expertise within the department to manage the 
Stockpile; and lack of documented plans and policies including a long-term strategic plan.  
16  The CPRs provide that an agency may approach a single entity through a limited tender process where 
‘the goods and services can be supplied only by a particular business and there is no reasonable 
alternative or substitute … due to an absence of competition for technical reasons’. See CPRs, 
paragraph 10.3(d) (iii).  
17  Achieving value for money is the ‘core rule’ of the CPRs, and financial approvers must be satisfied, after 
reasonable enquiries, that the procurement achieves a value for money outcome. See CPRs, 
paragraph 4.4.  
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processes  advertised  on AusTender.18  The  tenders were  subject  to  evaluation 
and  ranking  by  a  departmental  panel  according  to  previously  approved 
criteria, and advice  regarding value  for money was based on, and consistent 
with, the panel’s recommendations for the preferred tender.  
25. The  ANAO’s  2007–08  audit  identified  a  number  of  issues  with  the 
department’s storage contract arrangements  for  the Stockpile. Subcontracting 
arrangements had  resulted  in  inconsistent  standards and practices  that were 
poorly  controlled  through  the  contract  arrangements.  The  department 
responded through a process which consolidated short‐term storage contracts 
into  two  longer  term  contracts  relating  to  pharmaceutical  items  and  to  
non‐pharmaceutical  items.  An  open  tender  process  was  conducted  for  the 
storage  of  pharmaceutical  items,  with  three  submissions  received  and  one 
submission  assessed  as  fully  compliant.  While  the  successful  tenderer  was 
offered  a  contract  in  December  2007,  the  contract  was  not  executed  until 
October 2010, some three years later, due to differences over indemnity issues. 
A  second  tender,  to  consolidate  the  storage  of  non‐pharmaceutical  items, 
attracted  two  submissions  but  issues  identified  by  the  tender  evaluation 
committee19 prompted  the department  to  cease  the procurement process and 
directly procure  the  services of  an  existing warehouse provider on  the basis 
that an approach to the market had failed. The department cited the provider’s 
positive performance history with  the department  as  the  reason  for directly 
approaching this provider.  
26. The  ANAO  also  noted  in  its  2007–08  report  that  the  department’s 
contracts  for  warehousing  in  place  at  that  time  did  not  provide  a  clear 
statement of  contract  requirements.  In  the  current audit  the ANAO assessed 
the 2010–14 contract for  the pharmaceutical warehouse provider to assess the 
clarity  of  contract  deliverables.  While  the  contract  requires  six‐monthly 
performance  reports,  these are not always  submitted  to  the department, and 
the weekly stock‐on‐hand reports received by the department do not provide 
routine management  information.20 Further,  the  bi‐annual  stock  cycle  counts 
and annual visual inspections of the stock, also required under the contract, are 
                                                     
18  One supplier of PPE was identified as the preferred provider following an open tender process. The 
Department of Health established a Deed of Standing Offer allowing for the purchase of this PPE item 
as necessary and in accordance with an approved fee schedule.  
19  An independent financial check of one of the organisations identified viability concerns, while the 
proposal from the other organisation quoted relatively high fees.  
20  For instance, on new stock, damaged and expired stock and stock movements.  
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not  currently  being  carried  out  and  the  outcomes  are  not  reported.  The 
department  should  review  and  clarify  contract  reporting  arrangements  as  a 
basis for more effectively monitoring performance under the contract.  
27. The  contract  for  warehousing  personal  protective  equipment  has  a 




time,  the monthly  inventory management  report  has  also  become  a weekly 
stock‐on‐hand  report.21  This  arrangement  has  evolved  without  a  formal 
contract variation—an ad hoc approach which  can give  rise  to  inconsistency 
with contract requirements.  
28. The  department’s  annual  stocktake  of  warehoused  items  has  two 
purposes:  to  check  the  accuracy  of  its  information  on  the  Stockpile;  and  to 
identify  any  contract  management  issues.  The  stocktake  involves  physically 
checking  stock  against  departmental  records,  identifying  any  variation  and 
accounting  for  those  variations.  Significant  contract management  issues were 
identified  during  the  2011–12  and  2012–13  stocktakes,  concerning  the 
management of Stockpile inventory in two warehouses. The department advised 
the ANAO  that  it has recently approved alternative sites  for  these warehouses 
and the relevant contracts have been varied to reflect the new arrangements.  
Inventory Management (Chapter 4) 
29. The department has completed two reviews of the CBRN components 
of  the  Stockpile,  in  2004  and  2008.  The  2008  review  made  nine 
recommendations, including obtaining government agreement on the purpose 
of  the Stockpile. The  then Government agreed  to high  level outcomes  for  the 
Stockpile  in March 2011, while a number of other  recommendations are  still 
being progressed;  such  as  the development of  criteria  for  item  selection  and 
pre‐deployment of CBRN items with state governments.  
30. The  initial  stockpiling  of  antivirals  in  Australia  was  carried  out  in  
2003–04  as  a  response  to  increasing  concerns  about  avian  influenza  and  the 
potential  for  an  influenza pandemic.  In  its  2007–08  audit  report,  the ANAO 
                                                     
21  The report provides information on the number of pallets stored, as a basis for weekly payments to the 
contractor.  
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the  WHO  planning  framework  for  a  pandemic  including  stockpiling  of 
antivirals.  In  the  current  audit,  the  ANAO  examined  the  Department  of 
Health’s recent evidence gathering to support decisions for inventory selection 
and  the  quantity  of  antivirals  and  PPE  purchased  in  preparation  for  an 
influenza  pandemic.  The  department  has  commissioned  two  modelling 
projects—one on antivirals and one on PPE—to inform its consideration of the 
evidence base for the pandemic component of the Stockpile. The department’s 
approach  is  intended  to  provide  assurance  that  the  items  and  quantities 
purchased  to  maintain  the  currency  and  capability  of  the  Stockpile  are 
informed by appropriate evidence.  
31. The  2011  Strategic Review  identified  significant  costs  associated with 
expiring stock and the lack of cost‐effectiveness analysis in the selection of the 
Stockpile’s  inventory  and  quantities.22  The  main  focus  of  the  department’s 
activities  since  the  Strategic Review has been on  replenishing  expiring  stock 
and  responding  to  the  review’s  recommendations.  The  department  has 
commenced development of a more systematic approach to selecting items for 
the  Stockpile,  including  a  draft  inventory  selection  framework.  The 
Department of Health and stakeholder agencies have also explored a range of 
strategies to reduce Stockpile management costs, including: shelf life extension; 
stock  cycling  and  rotation;  returning  expired  pharmaceuticals  to 
manufacturers  in  return  for  fresh  stock; and purchasing generic antivirals as 
they  become  available.  The  department  has  also  conducted  progressively 
larger destruction programs to reduce the costs of storing expired items.  
32. The  ANAO  assessed  the  effectiveness  of  selected  controls  for  the 
management of  the Stockpile,  including processes  for monitoring, reconciling 
and  reporting  on  stock  levels.  The  ANAO  did  not  assess  processes  for  the 
disposal or destruction of expired stock as  this was  the subject of an  internal 




22  The expiry of stock and the need to replenish items to maintain operational capability has emerged as a 
key issue in the management of stockpile inventory in Australia and around the world. The 
pharmaceuticals and nearly all other stockpile items have a finite shelf life which means that they may 
need to be disposed of at the end of that life without being used. Further, the storage of expired stock 
incurs a cost.  
23  Department of Health,  ‘Audit of the Management of the Disposal of National Medical Stockpile Expired 
Stock’, Audit Report No.19 of 2011–12, Audit and Fraud Control Branch, January 2012. 
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22  The expiry of stock and the need to replenish items to maintain operational capability has emerged as a 
key issue in the management of stockpile inventory in Australia and around the world. The 
pharmaceuticals and nearly all other stockpile items have a finite shelf life which means that they may 
need to be disposed of at the end of that life without being used. Further, the storage of expired stock 
incurs a cost.  
23  Department of Health,  ‘Audit of the Management of the Disposal of National Medical Stockpile Expired 
Stock’, Audit Report No.19 of 2011–12, Audit and Fraud Control Branch, January 2012. 
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stock  reconciliation and management  reporting. The department advised  the 
ANAO that the recommended process improvements for disposing of expired 
stock had been implemented.  
33. The  ANAO  reviewed  controls  for  the  identification,  recording  and 
deployment  of  stock,  with  weaknesses  in  some  controls  resulting  in  data 
integrity  issues.  The  department  relies  on  a  number  of  information 
management  systems  and  processes  to  administer  the  Stockpile.24  In  the 
absence of system  interfaces  to support automatic data  transmission between 
the  information  management  systems,  the  department  employs  emails  and 
attachments  (including  manual  forms  and  spreadsheets)  to  transmit  key 
information. This has affected the completeness and accuracy of data stored for 
individual  items  in  the  department’s  Stockpile  database  resulting  in 
information discrepancies between the Stockpile database and the contractors’ 
warehouse system records. 
Deployment (Chapter 5) 
34. The department has developed a deployment framework that includes: 
memoranda  of  understanding  (MoUs)  with  the  states  and  territories;  a 
departmental  deployment  plan,  policy  and  procedures;  and  relevant 
provisions in contracts with the Stockpile warehouse providers. The states and 
territories  have  also  developed  stockpile  distribution  plans,  a  specific 
requirement  of  the MoUs. All MoUs were  current,  having  been  updated  in 
2010,  with  the  requirement  for  a  review  every  five  years.  However,  the 
department  held  current  distribution  plans  for  only  four  of  the  eight 
jurisdictions,  and  there  would  be  benefit  in  the  department  liaising  with 
jurisdictions which have not updated their plans, to address this deficiency.  
35. The  department  advises  its  warehouse  providers  to  select  stock  for 
deployment which has not exceeded  its expiry date, and has adequate  stock 
life for at  least a month before  its expiry date. The PPE warehouse provider’s 
warehouse management  system  is  capable of  selecting unexpired  stock on  a 
First‐In,  First‐Out  (FIFO)  basis;  an  approach which  can  provide  an  effective 
basis  for  selecting unexpired  stock  for deployment. However,  the  efficacy of 
this  approach  can be  affected by  factors  such  as: not  all PPE  stock having  a 
recorded expiry date; the PPE warehouse provider’s FIFO date resetting when 
                                                     
24  Including a standalone Stockpile database which records stockpile items and quantities; a range of 
supporting spreadsheets; and the external warehouse contractors’ inventory management systems.  
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stock  is moved  from one warehouse  to another; data  integrity  issues  arising 
from  inconsistencies  between  the  department’s  information  management 
systems  and  warehouse  provider  data;  and  warehouse  providers  not 
consistently attaching to pallets labels that record expiry details.  
36. The 2011 Strategic Review of the Stockpile observed that there was ‘no 
recording mechanism  that  can accurately determine how  returned  stock was 






returned  to  the  national  Stockpile,  indicated  weaknesses  in  a  number  of 
controls. There was no consideration of  the conditions under which  the  item 
had  been  transported  and  stored  after  deployment.  Further,  the  item  was 
returned  to  the Stockpile a month  later without examination and assessment 
by an authorised person as required by the Australian code.  
37. In  its 2007–08 audit, the ANAO recommended that  the Department of 
Health  adequately  test  its  deployment  plans  in  conjunction with  states  and 
territories.  In  September  2012,  the department’s  audit  committee  considered 




of  pandemic  items  since  the  last  pandemic  in  2009.  The  department  also 
informed  the ANAO  that  no  testing  of  the deployment  of CBRN  items  had 
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Summary of agency response 
38. The Department of Health provided  the  following summary  response 
to the proposed audit report: 
The  Department  of  Health  notes  the  audit  report  and  agrees  with  the 
recommendations. To date,  the Department of Health has  invested  significant 
resources, including approximately $4 million and a dedicated taskforce, to the 
development  of  reforms  to  enhance  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  the 
management and operation of the National Medical Stockpile. Reform activities, 
that will address all of  the  recommendations  in  the audit  report, will now be 
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Stockpile,  the ANAO recommends  that  the Department 
of Health:  
(a)  update  the  strategic  management  plan  to  identify 
objectives, priorities and strategies to be implemented in 
the short term and over the longer term; and  







are  being  met,  the  ANAO  recommends  that  the 
Department  of  Health  review  and  clarify  reporting 






To  improve  the  management  and  integrity  of  data 
relating  to  the  National  Medical  Stockpile,  the  ANAO 
recommends  that  the Department  of Health  review  its 






To  provide  assurance  that  deployment  arrangements 
will  be  effective  in  a  national  health  emergency,  the 
ANAO  recommends  that  the  Department  of  Health 
undertake  planning  to  test  the  current  Stockpile 
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medicines, vaccines,  antidotes  and protective  equipment  available  for use  as 
part of  the national  response  to a public health  emergency.  It  is  intended  to 
augment  state  and  territory  government  reserves  of  key medical  items  in  a 
health emergency, which could arise from terrorist activities or natural causes 
such as the 2009 influenza pandemic.25 





1.3 The  Stockpile  was  originally  established  in  2002  as  part  of  the 




almost  $196 million  in  2012–13.27 The Stockpile,  comprising  42 products  and 
over 110 million items, is now dominated by products associated with human 
influenza pandemic preparedness.28 
1.4 The  Department  of  Health  is  responsible  for  the  planning  and 
management  of  the  Stockpile,  while  state  and  territory  governments  are 
responsible for deploying Stockpile items within their jurisdictions in the event 
                                                     
25  Many products would be used to support the Australian community in the event of an emergency but 
many are stockpiled for more strategic use for example, for health care workers or at risk groups. 
26  The Stockpile is comprised of specialised pharmaceuticals and personal protective equipment from 
overseas suppliers. Securing an adequate supply of relevant items in the timeframes required can be a 
challenge if there is a global surge in demand, as would be the case in a pandemic.  
27  Department of Health and Ageing, Annual Report, Audited Financial Statements, 2013, p. 349. The 
Department of Health advised in June 2014 that the value of the Stockpile in 2013–14 is approximately 
$192 million.  
28  Ernst & Young, ‘National Medical Stockpile Stocktake, 2012–13’, Commonwealth of Australia, 2013. 
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of  a  national  health  emergency.  The  Stockpile  is  warehoused  at  facilities 
operated by logistics firms, under contracts administered by the department.  
1.5 Key challenges in planning for and administering the Stockpile include 
effective:  stock  selection  and  procurement;  warehousing  to  maintain  the 
efficacy  of  items;  stock‐control  to  account  for  and  locate  items;  and  dealing 
with items as they reach their expiry dates. Unlike other inventories which are 
continually  being  recycled,  an  emergency  stockpile  is  infrequently deployed 
and significant volumes of unused goods need to be disposed of on expiry. 
Development of the Stockpile 






assess  the  likely  threats  to  public  health  posed  by  terrorism  and  to  devise 
mitigation  strategies  to  deal  with  the  impact  of  any  such  events.29  The 
deliberations of the CBRN Committee informed the department’s thinking on 
the  essential  items  for  initial  inclusion  in  the  Stockpile.  While  the  CBRN 




is  now  known  as  the  Australian  Health  Protection  Principal  Committee 
(AHPPC).31 
1.8 In 2003–04  the Government allocated nearly $124 million  to purchase 
antiviral  medicines  for  the  Stockpile  in  response  to  an  outbreak  of  Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) overseas  in November 2002.32 Following 
                                                     
29  The department no longer convenes a CBRN Committee. Instead the Chief Medical Officer receives 
security briefings from the intelligence community (that is, ASIO, Defence and the Australian Federal 
Police) on a six-monthly basis. 
30  Pandemic influenza is one of a small number of infectious diseases that pose a significant global threat. 
The two relatively mild pandemics of the twentieth century, in 1957 and 1968, each resulted in two 
million deaths worldwide while the most severe, in 1918, caused more than 20 million deaths globally.  
31  AHPPC was previously known as the Australian Health Protection Committee (AHPC). 
32  Australian Government, Budget Measures: Budget Paper No. 2: 2004–05, Commonwealth of Australia, 
2004, p. 296. 
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Asia which prompted  the purchase  of  additional  antiviral medicines  for  the 
Stockpile. 
1.9 In  2005–06,  the  government  allocated  an  additional  $135  million  to 
purchase  medicines  and  equipment  for  the  Stockpile  and  $32  million  to 
enhance  the  department’s  capacity  to  respond  to  an  influenza  pandemic. 
Specific initiatives included: 
 establishing  the Office of Health Protection within  the Department of 
Health to build national capacity and capability to detect, prevent and 
respond to threats to public health and safety; 
 establishing  contracts  with  influenza  vaccine  manufacturers  for  the 
guaranteed supply of vaccines during a pandemic; 
 providing funding to accelerate research on influenza and pandemics; 
 strengthening  health  surveillance  and  laboratory  diagnosis  capacity; 
and 
 developing  a  Stockpile  deployment  plan  in  consultation  with  state 
governments.33 
2009 Influenza Pandemic 
1.10 The 2009 (H1N1) pandemic led to a major deployment of the Stockpile 
in Australia. Some 900 000 courses of antivirals (valued at $28.8 million) were 
deployed  during  the  pandemic  and  almost  2.1  million  items  of  personal 
protective  equipment  (PPE—for  example,  masks)  were  deployed  to  health 
workers to guard against the spread of H1N1. An additional 170 000 items of 
PPE  were  provided  to  Australian  Government  border  agencies  to  protect 
workers and 2700 basic health packs were provided  to  individuals subject  to 
quarantine.  
1.11 In September 2011,  the department  finalised a review of  the Australian 
health  sector’s  response  to  the  2009  pandemic,  which  made 
25 recommendations. The key finding relating to the Stockpile was that while it 
met the relatively limited demands of the 2009 pandemic, which was considered 
to  be  of moderate  intensity,  it may  not meet  the more  intense demands  of  a 
                                                     
33  Department of Health and Ageing, Annual Report 2006-07, Canberra, 2007, p.165. 
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was  established  in November  2011  to oversee  implementation of  the  review’s 
recommendations, and implementation remains ongoing.35 
The Stockpile today  
1.12 Figure 1.1 shows funds allocated to the Stockpile over the past 12 years.  
Figure 1.1:  Funding of the National Medical Stockpile (2002 to 2014) 
 
Source: ANAO.36   
1.13  As discussed, the Stockpile has expanded substantially from its origins 
in primarily  combating CBRN  threats  to  now  being dominated  by products 
associated  with  human  influenza  pandemic  preparedness.  Figure  1.2  shows 
that the CBRN component of the Stockpile is now $12 million (six per cent) while 
preparedness  for  pandemic  influenza  accounts  for  the  rest—pharmaceuticals 
worth $157 million (80 per cent) and PPE valued at $27 million (14 per cent). 
                                                     
34  Department of Health, Review of Australia’s Health Sector Response to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009: 
Lessons Identified, [internet], 2011, <http://www.health.gov.au> [accessed 29 October 2013], p. xi.  
35  The Committee, now disbanded, was chaired by the Commonwealth Chief Medical Officer, and included 
relevant government and medical representatives. 
36  Data sourced from Department of Finance advice to the ANAO, dated 8 August 2013, drawing on 
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Figure 1.2: Value of each component of the National Medical Stockpile 
 
Source: Department of Health expenditure figures as at 30 June 2013. 
1.14 The  main  components  of  the  Stockpile  are  antivirals  (Tamiflu  and 
Relenza) which are used to treat patients with influenza like symptoms and to 
prevent  the  spread  of  the  disease  by  targeting  vulnerable  groups  with 
underlying health conditions and health care workers in exposure prone areas.  
1.15 A  key  challenge  for  the  Department  of  Health  in  managing  the 
Stockpile  is  the  limited shelf  life of stockpiled goods. Antivirals,  for example, 
typically have a seven to 10 year shelf life.37 Unlike other inventories which are 





37  Shelf life is specific to a product. The Department of Health secured an extension to shelf life for 
antivirals from the manufacturers, Roche (Tamiflu) and GlaxoSmithKline (Relenza). Tamiflu currently 
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Figure 1.3: Value of expired stock and non-expired stock  
 
Source: Department of Health, Annual Reports. 
2011 Strategic review 
1.17 The  limited  shelf  life of medicines  and  equipment  and  the  long  term 
maintenance  of  emergency  stockpiles  constitute  a  significant  cost  for 
government. In 2011, the Department of Finance completed a strategic review38 
which  recommended a number of  significant  changes  to  the management of 
the Stockpile, including: 
 improving the existing inventory management arrangements;  
 improving  the  strategic  planning,  information management/reporting 
systems and stock deployment arrangements;  
 adopting  a more  proactive  approach  to  stock management,  to  avoid 
having to store expired items; and 
 transferring  to a more commercially  focussed model, such as a  ‘prime 
vendor’  arrangement  where  some  of  the  stockpile  management 
functions could be outsourced under a single contract.  
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1.18 In  response  to  the 2011 Strategic Review,  the Australian Government 
committed $6.8 million  in 2011–12 and an additional $15.4 million over  four 
years in the 2014–15 Budget to improve the management of the Stockpile.39 The 
2014–15  Budget measure  is  for  the  implementation  of management  reforms 
intended  to  reduce  waste,  decrease  risk,  increase  the  surety  of  supply  and 
strengthen deployment arrangements. 
Previous ANAO audit reports  
1.19 The  Australian  National  Audit  Office  (ANAO)  examined  Australia’s 
preparedness  to  respond  to  a  human  influenza  pandemic  in  2007–08.40  The 
audit  concluded  that  the  department  had  not  developed  an  appropriate 
framework  for  managing  the  Stockpile.  Key  issues  relating  to  the 
administration of the National Medical Stockpile included: 
 the  lack  of  an  implementation  strategy  for  the  establishment  and 
ongoing management of the Stockpile;  
 operational  management  shortcomings  relating  to  monitoring 
contracts,  approving  subcontracting  arrangements  and  inventory 
management; and 
 poor  understanding  of  state  governments’  deployment  arrangements 
which could impede effective deployment of the Stockpile. 
1.20 The  audit  observed  that while  the Department  of Health’s  focus had 
been on procuring and storing the Stockpile,  its focus should shift from short 
term  ‘supply and  store’  to a  longer‐term management  strategy, underpinned 
by a proper assessment of  the risks  involved  in managing and deploying  the 
Stockpile.41 The audit made three recommendations in relation to the Stockpile 
which  were  agreed  by  the  department.  The  relevant  recommendations  are 
reproduced at Appendix 2. 
                                                     
39  Australian Government, Budget Measures: Budget Paper No. 2: 2014–15, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra, 2014, p. 12. 
40  ANAO Performance Audit Report No.6 2007-08 Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza 
Pandemic, Commonwealth of Australia, 2007. 
41  ibid., pp. 20–21, pp. 95-99. 
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Audit objective, criteria, scope and methodology 
1.22 The audit objective was to assess the effectiveness of the Department of 
Health’s management of the National Medical Stockpile. 
1.23 To  assist  in  evaluating  the department’s performance  in  terms  of  the 
audit objective, the ANAO developed the following high level criteria: 
 the Department of Health has sound governance arrangements in place 
for  the  management  of  the  Stockpile,  including  an  integrated  and 
systematic approach to risk management and performance reporting;  
 the  Department  of  Health’s  procurement  and  contract  management 
arrangements for the Stockpile demonstrate a focus on getting the right 
outcomes and achieving value for money; 
 the  Stockpile’s  inventory  management  system  reflects  value  for 






1.24 The ANAO did not assess processes  for  the disposal or destruction of 
expired stock.42 While  the audit examined aspects of  the deployment strategy 
for the Stockpile,  it did not seek to assess Australia’s general preparedness to 
respond  to a national health emergency. Nor did  the audit assess  the clinical 
efficacy of stockpiled items.  
                                                     
42  For example, the ANAO did not undertake control testing of the disposal or destruction of expired stock. 
The disposal of expired stock was the subject of a 2012 internal audit by the department.  
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 review  of  the  information  management  arrangements  used  by  the 
department  and  its  external  service  providers,  which  included 
conducting an assessment of selected controls; and  
 interviews  with  relevant  departmental  staff  and  key  stakeholders, 
including  officials  from  state  government  departments  and  relevant 
experts. 
1.26 The  audit  fieldwork  was  mainly  conducted  between  June  2013  and 
December 2013. The audit was conducted in accordance with ANAO Auditing 
Standards at a cost of approximately $597 000. 
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2. Strategic Framework  
This  chapter  examines  the  Department  of  Health’s  framework  for  managing  the 





are  identified  and  addressed. An  effective  strategic  framework will  identify 
objectives,  strategies,  priorities  and  timeframes,  which  should  be  reviewed 
regularly and updated to reflect changing circumstances. The ANAO’s 2007–08 
performance  audit  report  Australia’s  Preparedness  for  a  Human  Influenza 
Pandemic,  concluded  that  the department  had not developed  an  appropriate 
framework for managing the Stockpile.43   






Governance and administrative arrangements 
2.3 The  Stockpile was  established  in  2002 by  the Australian Government 
without a specific  legislative  framework, although elements of  the Quarantine 
Act  1908,  National  Health  Security  Act  2007  and  Therapeutic  Goods  Act  1989 
govern aspects of the Stockpile’s management and deployment processes.44 
                                                     
43  ANAO Performance Audit Report No.6 2007–08 Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza 
Pandemic, Commonwealth of Australia, 2007, p. 90. 
44  The Therapeutic Goods Act 1989, for instance, allows the responsible Minister to exempt therapeutic 
goods from some of the regulatory requirements of the legislation if the Minister is satisfied that these 
goods need to be stockpiled to prepare for a potential threat to public health or to respond urgently to an 
actual threat. These provisions have been used to import many of the CBRN items that are not 
registered or listed through the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989.  
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2.4 The Department of Health  is responsible  for coordinating a response 
to  a  national  health  emergency  which  may  include  deployment  of  the 
Stockpile.  The  Health  Emergency  Management  Branch  within  the  Office  of 
Health  Protection45  is  responsible  for  the  day‐to‐day  management  of  the 
Stockpile within  the  broader  context  of  national  health  emergency  planning 
and  response. The Branch  includes  the Health Emergency Countermeasures 
Section with  responsibilities  for  the management  of  the  Stockpile  including: 
procurement, storage, inventory management, disposal and reporting.46 
2.5 The Health Emergency Management Branch also provides secretariat 
support  for  the Australian Health  Protection  Principal Committee  (AHPPC) 
which  is  chaired  by  the  Australian  Government’s  Chief  Medical  Officer 
(CMO).  The  CMO  provides  operational  oversight  of  the  Stockpile  and  has 
authority to approve deployment of the Stockpile to assist  in responding to a 
health emergency.47  
2.6 The AHPPC was established by Australian Health Ministers  in 2006  to 
coordinate  a national  response  to  a health  emergency.  Figure  2.1  outlines  the 
AHPPC and its current committee structure. Under the National Health Security 
Agreement  200848,  AHPPC  is  to  coordinate  the  national  response  under  the 




45  The Office of Health Protection is responsible for building capability to detect, prevent and respond to 
threats to public health and safety. As part of a 2004–05 Budget initiative, the Office of Health Protection 
was established to enhance the department’s capacity to respond to an influenza pandemic.  
46  The Health Emergency Management Branch is part of the OHP and is responsible for surveillance of 
current and emerging communicable disease threats to the Australian population, in partnership with 
other jurisdictions and stakeholders. The Branch also monitors and implements effective and sustained 
responses to national health emergencies and risks. These national health emergencies and risks 
include mass casualty events, communicable disease outbreaks, terrorism and natural disasters. 
47  The CMO is able to approve the release of stockpiled items apart from those that have been exempted 
from the regulatory requirements of the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989.The Secretary of the Department 
of Health has the legislative authority for the release and use of pharmaceuticals exempted under the 
Therapeutic Goods Act 1989. Once the Secretary of Health has approved the release and use of these 
pharmaceuticals, then the CMO has administrative authority to deploy them from the Stockpile to the 
relevant jurisdictions. 
48  The role of the AHPPC is outlined in Part 6 of the National Health Security Agreement.  
49  Emergency response plans and protocols include the Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic 
Influenza (AHMPPI); the domestic response plan for mass casualty incidents of national consequence 
(AUSTRAUMAPLAN) and the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear counter-terrorism plan 
(CBRNPLAN). 
50  Department of Health, National Health Emergency Response Arrangements, [internet], 
<http://www.health.gov.au>, [accessed 29 October 2013], Canberra, 2011, p.10–11. 
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Figure 2.1:  AHPPC and its standing committees  
 
Source: ANAO.  
2.7 Membership of the AHPPC includes the Commonwealth CMO, Chief 
Health  Officers  (CHOs)  from  state  and  territory  governments,  the  Chair  of 
each AHPPC standing committee, representatives from the Australian Defence 
Force  and  Emergency  Management  Australia,  health  disaster  officials  and 
clinical experts. The AHPPC meets three times a year with a group of AHPPC 
members  sometimes  meeting  the  day  after  to  discuss  issues  specific  to  the 
procurement,  operation  and  deployment  of  the  Stockpile.  Members  of  the 






2.8 State  governments  are  responsible  for  responding  to  public  health 
events  within  their  jurisdictions,  and  can  request  a  national  health  sector 
response  to  a health  incident  in  the  event  that  it  is  likely  to overwhelm  their 
resources or cross state boundaries. The AHPPC is responsible for coordinating 
a  national  health  sector  response  in  accordance with  relevant  legislation  and 
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released  from  the Stockpile  reach  the  right  recipients within  their  jurisdiction. 
Memoranda  of  Understanding  (MoUs)  have  been  developed  with  each  state 
government for the receipt, storage and use of pharmaceuticals and equipment 
from  the  Stockpile.  To  provide  expert  advice  on  improving  collaborative 
arrangements  between  Commonwealth  and  state  health  authorities,  the 
department established the National Medical Stockpile Advisory Group in 2012. 
Other Advisory Groups 
2.9 The department  also  engages with  a number  of  advisory  groups  in 
relation to the management of the Stockpile. 
Clinical and security advice  
2.10 The department’s Medical and Scientific Advisory Unit is available to 
provide  clinical,  scientific  and  public  health  advice  and  support  for  the 
Stockpile. This unit has reviewed the planning assumptions that underpin the 
Australian  Health  Management  Plan  for  Pandemic  Influenza  (AHMPPI), 
which should help inform consideration of appropriate quantities of stockpile 
items for an effective pandemic response. The department also established the 




The  CMO  also  receives  security  briefings  from  the  intelligence  community 
(that  is, ASIO, Defence  and  the Australian  Federal  Police)  on  a  six‐monthly 
basis on potential security threats.  
Interdepartmental Steering Committee 
2.11 An  Interdepartmental Steering Committee  (IDSC) was established  in 
August  2011  to  provide  high  level  advice  and  strategic  direction  to  the 
department on the significant issues identified in the Department of Finance’s 
2011  Strategic  Review  of  the  Stockpile.  The  IDSC  was  established  with 




51  Under the National Health Security Act 2007 and National Health Security Agreement signed by 
Australian Health Ministers on 18 April 2008.  
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2.12 The  IDSC had  its  first meeting  in November  2011  and  continues  to 
meet regularly  to provide strategic advice  to  the department. The minutes of 
the IDSC reflect the progress made by the department over the last two years 
in examining the issues raised in the Strategic Review. These include: assessing 
the  outsourcing  of  Stockpile  management  functions  to  a  third  party; 
identifying  supply  chain  procurement  risks;  examining  a  range  of  cost 
effectiveness measures  to minimise stock  loss  through expiry; and  improving 
coordination arrangements with state health departments.52  
Strategic planning  
2.13 A  strategic  plan  should  provide  a  high  level  view  of  the  objectives, 
priorities and strategies to be undertaken in the short and longer‐term. 
2.14 The  ANAO’s  2007–08  audit  observed  that  the  establishment  of  the 
Stockpile in 2002 occurred without the high level planning, assessment of risks 
and management processes that would usually be put into place by an agency 
to manage  policy  initiatives.53  This was  partly  due  to  the  immediacy  of  the 
Stockpile’s  formation  in an environment of rapidly changing and unexpected 
international events.54  
2.15 The department developed  a  strategic plan  for  the  Stockpile  in  2010, 
some  eight  years  after  the  Stockpile was  first  established.  The  plan  broadly 
describes  the  governance,  funding  and  administrative  arrangements  for  the 





2.16 The  high  level  outcomes  of  the  Stockpile  agreed  by  the  then 
Government are to:  
(a) provide  a  strategic  reserve  of  medicines,  vaccines,  antidotes  and 
personal protective equipment for use in a national response to a public 
                                                     
52  The IDSC was supported by a National Medical Stockpile Taskforce resourced by staff from the 
Department of Health. The Taskforce was established to scope new arrangements for the Stockpile 
stemming from the 2011 Strategic Review. It operated from October 2011 to December 2012. 
53  ANAO Audit Report No.6 2007–08, Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza Pandemic, p.87. 
54  ibid. p. 87. 
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52  The IDSC was supported by a National Medical Stockpile Taskforce resourced by staff from the 
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stemming from the 2011 Strategic Review. It operated from October 2011 to December 2012. 
53  ANAO Audit Report No.6 2007–08, Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza Pandemic, p.87. 
54  ibid. p. 87. 
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and  to  provide  an  immediate  source  of  supply  of  highly  specialised 
medicines  in  an  emergency  that  may  not  be  held  elsewhere  in  the 
Australian pharmaceutical supply system.  








Figure 2.2: Scope of activities for managing the Stockpile 
 
Source: ANAO. 
Note:  AHMPPI is the Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza.  
2.19 The  ANAO’s  assessment  of  the  2010  National  Medical  Stockpile 
Strategic Management Plan (strategic plan) indicates that there is scope for the 
department  to update and  refine  its strategic plan so  that  it clearly  identifies 
                                                     
55  The department advised the ANAO that it had attempted to draft a revised strategic plan in 2012–13 but 
was unsuccessful as stakeholders were not keen to pursue this activity until an outcome from the reform 
process was achieved. 
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2.20 A  well  structured  risk  management  framework  will  facilitate  the 
identification  of  risks  and possible  treatments,  and  strengthen planning  and 
decision‐making  processes.  The  ANAO’s  2007–08  audit  of  Australia’s 
Preparedness for a Human Influenza Pandemic recommended that the department 
develop a risk management plan for the Stockpile that is regularly reviewed.57 
2.21 The  current  audit  examined  the  two  risk  management  plans  that 
support  the department’s management of  the  Stockpile—the Enterprise Risk 





Enterprise Risk Management Plan  
2.22 The department maintains an Enterprise Risk Management Plan for the 
department’s strategic level risks. Operational risks are managed at a division, 
branch,  program  and  project  level.  Under  the  department’s  reporting 




to  the adequacy of government  funding  to maintain stock holdings. This had 
been rated as a ‘high’ risk to the department. 
Operational Risk Management Plan  
2.24 The department developed  an  operational  risk management  plan  for 
the  Stockpile  in  July  2010,  some  time  after  the  Stockpile was  established  in 
                                                     
56  This is the subject of a recommendation later in this chapter. 
57  ANAO Audit Report No.6 2007–08 Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza Pandemic, p. 32. 
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2.25 While  security  of  information  has  been  identified  in  the  2010  risk 
management  plan  as  one  of  the  three  most  significant  risks  for  the 





identified  some key  issues  in  the management  of  the  Stockpile,  such  as  the: 
inadequacy of the information management system for accurate recording and 
reporting  on  the  Stockpile’s  inventory;  lack  of  logistical  and  inventory 
expertise  within  the  department  to  manage  the  Stockpile;  and  lack  of 
documented plans and policies including a long term strategic plan. The 2010 
risk management plan should be updated to reflect these risks.  
2.27 The department’s Audit  and Fraud Control Branch  conducted  follow 
up  audits  on  the  implementation  of  recommendations  from  the  2007–08 
ANAO  report  in December  2008  and,  again,  in  July  2011. The  2011  Internal 
Audit report recommended that the risk management plan could be enhanced 
by including additional risks identified in the 2011 Strategic Review.  
2.28 The  department  did,  however,  identify  two  risks  in  its  2010  risk 




2.29 As  shown  in Figure  2.3,  stock  expiry was  an  emerging  issue by  2010 
and by June 2011 $145 million worth of stock had expired. The department has 
advised that storage costs for expired items for the 2010–11 financial year were 
approximately  $160  000.  The  expired  stock  comprised  some  2352  pallets  in 
storage,  the  bulk  of  which  were  PPE,  influenza  antivirals  and  antibiotics. 
Storage  costs  for  expired  items  for  the  2009‐10  financial  year  were  almost 
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Figure 2.3: National Medical Stockpile; expired and deployed stock 
 
Source: Department of Health, Annual Reports from 2003–04 to 2012–13.  
2.30 The department’s approach has been  to dispose of expired stock only 
when  government  funds  are  available  to  replenish  expired  stock.  The 
department has received Budget funding to replenish expiring stock in recent 




matter  for  government decision,  the department must  also  assess  the  safety 





58  Department of Finance, ‘Review of the National Medical Stockpile’, 2011, pp 73-74. 
59  The 2014–15 Budget also made provision for the purchase of antivenoms and vaccines, but the 
expenditure for this measure was not published in the Budget papers due to commercial sensitivity. See 
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2.31 Figure  2.4  shows  the  value  of  expired  and  disposed  stock  between 
2007–12;  illustrating  the  substantial  costs  associated  with  stockpiling  items 
with an inherently limited shelf–life.  




the Stockpile, a key  recommendation  from  the 2011 Strategic Review was  to 











2.33 The department  commissioned  consultants  to  identify  and  assess  the 
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considered  in  the  context  of  assessing  and  managing  risks  relating  to  the 
Stockpile.  
2.34 In summary,  the Stockpile’s 2010  risk management plan has not been 
reviewed  or  amended  to  reflect  key  risks  and  challenges  identified  by 
subsequent  reviews  of  the  Stockpile.  The  department  should  review  the 
Stockpile’s operational risk management plan  to assess risks  in  light of  those 
reviews  and,  as  necessary,  identify  risk  treatments.  A  review  would  be 




Recommendation No.1  














Internal reporting  
2.39 The  ANAO’s  2007–08  audit  recommended  the  development  of  a 
performance  management  and  reporting  framework  for  the  Stockpile  that 
provides  ongoing  assurance  about  the  content,  storage,  security  and 
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management of  the Stockpile. The ANAO observed  that  it was  important  to 
report on whether  the  Stockpile  is being  efficiently  and  effectively managed 
and provided examples of key performance  indicators that could be  included 
in  a  performance  report,  specifically:  progress  with  procurement  action, 
delivery  and  storage  action,  stock  due  to  expire,  status  of  stocktakes, 
movement  of  stockpile  goods,  relocation  of  storage  sites  and  issues  with 
storage providers. The department agreed to the relevant recommendations.60 
2.40 A  follow‐up  internal audit  conducted by  the department’s Audit and 
Fraud  Control  Branch  in  2009  concluded  that  quarterly  reports  had  been 
introduced  and  provided  to  departmental  executives.61  The  scope  of  these 
reports included data on expiring stock, new purchases, current procurements, 
deployment activity, finances and a summary of current holdings. From April 
2011,  quarterly  reports  on  the  status  of  the  Stockpile  were  discontinued  in 
favour of issue specific updates to the departmental executive. For instance, an 
update  was  provided  to  the  CMO  in  April  2013  which  outlined  current 
procurement action. 
2.41 Current  internal  reporting  on  the  Stockpile  is  ad  hoc  and  limited  to 
inventory reporting with  little capacity  to report on how well  the program  is 
performing against key objectives and a range of performance measures. The 
department  will  need  to  exercise  judgement  that  the  revised  approach, 
focusing  on  issue  specific  updates,  provides  an  adequate  basis  for  senior 
management to assess performance.  
External reporting 
2.42 At  present  there  is  no  specific  performance  indicator  regarding  the 
Stockpile in the department’s Portfolio Budget Statements. The department last 
reported  against  specific  indicators  for  the  Stockpile  in  its  2010–11  Annual 
Report. The 2010–11 performance indicators were: 
 material  in  the  National  Medical  Stockpile  is  replaced  as  it  expires 
(replacement times as close to the item’s expiry date as possible); and 
                                                     
60  ANAO Audit Report No.6 2007–08, Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza Pandemic, p.90. 
61  Department of Health, ‘Follow-up Audit of the National Medical Stockpile’, Final Report No.12 of 
2009-10, Audit and Fraud Control Branch, December 2009, p. 11. 
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 capacity  for  the  timely deployment of  the National Medical Stockpile 
(measured by  the deployment of  the Stockpile either  through exercise 
or live deployment, meeting the six hour response benchmark). 
2.43 The department advised the ANAO that it has shifted its focus to more 
high‐level,  strategic  reporting  in  the Portfolio Budget Statements and annual 
reports. This has been part of a department‐wide  shift  to align with broader 
reforms  in  agency  performance  reporting.  While  specific  performance 
information  is  not  provided  through  the  department’s  annual  reports  or 
Portfolio Budget Statements,  the department has advised  that  it has publicly 
released  information  on  the  Stockpile,  including  a  report  on  the  2009 H1N1 
Pandemic response which documented Stockpile activities and capabilities. 
Conclusion 
2.44 The  ANAO’s  2007–08  audit  observed  that  the  establishment  of  the 
Stockpile in 2002 occurred without the high‐level planning, assessment of risks 
and management processes that would usually be put into place by an agency 
to  manage  policy  initiatives.  This  was  partly  due  to  the  immediacy  of  the 
Stockpile’s  formation  in an environment of rapidly changing and unexpected 
international events.  







an  important step  towards developing a more strategic approach  to managing 
the  Stockpile. The department  should  update  the  2010  Strategic Management 
Plan  to  reflect  this  development  and  to  include  objectives,  priorities  and 
strategies. 
2.46 In  its  2007–08 performance  audit,  the ANAO  also  recommended  that 




management plan  for  the Stockpile  in  July 2010, which documents  risks,  risk 
ratings and treatment strategies. The operational risk management plan ranks 
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Pandemic response which documented Stockpile activities and capabilities. 
Conclusion 
2.44 The  ANAO’s  2007–08  audit  observed  that  the  establishment  of  the 
Stockpile in 2002 occurred without the high‐level planning, assessment of risks 
and management processes that would usually be put into place by an agency 
to  manage  policy  initiatives.  This  was  partly  due  to  the  immediacy  of  the 
Stockpile’s  formation  in an environment of rapidly changing and unexpected 
international events.  







an  important step  towards developing a more strategic approach  to managing 
the  Stockpile. The department  should  update  the  2010  Strategic Management 
Plan  to  reflect  this  development  and  to  include  objectives,  priorities  and 
strategies. 
2.46 In  its  2007–08 performance  audit,  the ANAO  also  recommended  that 
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2.47 The  ANAO  further  recommended,  in  its  2007–08  audit  report,  the 
development of a performance management and reporting framework for the 
Stockpile,  to  provide  ongoing  assurance  about  the  content,  storage,  security 
and management of the Stockpile. While quarterly reports were subsequently 
prepared  for  senior management,  the department  advised  the ANAO  in  the 
course  of  the  current  audit  that  quarterly  reporting  on  the  status  of  the 
Stockpile was discontinued from April 2011 in favour of issue specific updates. 




ANAO Audit Report No.53 2013–14 
Management of the National Medical Stockpile 
 
50 














Sourcing items for the Stockpile 
3.3 The department has a total of 31 current contracts relating to the supply 
of  items and  services  for  the Stockpile. Figure 3.1  identifies  the number and 
types  of  contracts,  with  most  of  the  contracts  (27  contracts)  relating  to  the 
supply of pharmaceutical items and personal protective equipment. 
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Figure 3.1:  Types of contracts for the Stockpile at 30 June 2013 
 
Source:  ANAO.  
Note:  * PPE is personal protective equipment which includes masks and respirators. 
 ** CBRN refers to stockpile items for responding to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
threats. 
3.4 The  current  contracts  for  the  supply  of  pharmaceuticals  and  personal 
protective equipment (PPE) for the Stockpile have been negotiated with overseas 
suppliers.62  The  pharmaceutical  items  have  either  been  manufactured  and/or 
supplied  by  pharmaceutical  companies within  Europe  and  the United  States; 
while PPE  items have been  sourced mainly  from Asian  companies. Access  to 






62  The markets for many of the key pharmaceuticals held within the Stockpile are reliant on one supplier 
globally and none of these suppliers are based in Australia, although they may have an Australian arm.  
63  Section 18A of the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 provides for an exemption from some of the regulatory 
requirements of Division 2 of part 3–2 of the Act in order to stockpile pharmaceutical items in preparation for 
a public health emergency. The 18A approval is provided to the Australian Quarantine and Inspection 
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The procurement of stockpile items 
3.5 The  procurement  of  appropriate  items  for  the  Stockpile  involves  a 
range of considerations, including the (sometimes limited) availability of stock 
in  an  international market,  the  availability  of  funding,  the  clinical  evidence 
base, and the expiry dates of stockpile items.  
3.6 The  ANAO  examined  departmental  procurement  processes  for  the 
Stockpile  items  under  current  contract  arrangements,  to  establish  whether 
value for money had been considered in the purchasing decisions. Specifically, 
departmental approvals for the commitment of public money provided under 
Regulation  9  of  the  Financial  Management  and  Accountability  Regulations 
1997 and tender evaluation documents, where applicable, were reviewed.64  
3.7 Australian  Government  policy  on  procurement  is  set  out  in  the 
Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs).65 Achieving value for money is the 
‘core  rule’  of  the  CPRs66,  and  its  application  in  the  procurement  process 
contributes  to  the proper use of Commonwealth  resources.67 The CPRs allow 
for  a  so‐called  ‘limited  tender’  process  in  certain  circumstances,  and  this 






64  Regulation 9 requires an approver to be satisfied, after making reasonable inquiries, that giving effect to 
a spending proposal would be a proper use of Commonwealth resources. ‘Proper use’ in this context 
means ‘efficient, effective, economical and ethical use that is not inconsistent with the policies of the 
Commonwealth’, as specified in section 44 of the FMA Act and FMA Regulation 9. This is often referred 
to as the ‘value for money‘ test. 
65  The CPRs came into force on 1 July 2012, replacing the Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines 
(CPGs). There is no significant difference between the two in respect of the limited tender process 
discussed in this section. 
66  CPRs, paragraph 4.4. 
67  CPGs, paragraph 4.4(b). 
68  The ANAO examined the Regulation 9 advices and approvals to establish the basis on which a limited 
tender process was agreed. The department justified a limited tender approach for most cases on the 
basis that there was only one provider of the product. The CPRs at paragraph 10.3(d) (iii) provide that a 
Commonwealth agency may approach a single entity through a limited tender process ‘where the goods 
and services can be supplied only by a particular business and there is no reasonable alternative or 
substitute…due to an absence of competition for technical reasons’. 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.53 2013–14 
Management of the National Medical Stockpile 
 
52 
The procurement of stockpile items 
3.5 The  procurement  of  appropriate  items  for  the  Stockpile  involves  a 
range of considerations, including the (sometimes limited) availability of stock 
in  an  international market,  the  availability  of  funding,  the  clinical  evidence 
base, and the expiry dates of stockpile items.  
3.6 The  ANAO  examined  departmental  procurement  processes  for  the 
Stockpile  items  under  current  contract  arrangements,  to  establish  whether 
value for money had been considered in the purchasing decisions. Specifically, 
departmental approvals for the commitment of public money provided under 
Regulation  9  of  the  Financial  Management  and  Accountability  Regulations 
1997 and tender evaluation documents, where applicable, were reviewed.64  
3.7 Australian  Government  policy  on  procurement  is  set  out  in  the 
Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs).65 Achieving value for money is the 
‘core  rule’  of  the  CPRs66,  and  its  application  in  the  procurement  process 
contributes  to  the proper use of Commonwealth  resources.67 The CPRs allow 
for  a  so‐called  ‘limited  tender’  process  in  certain  circumstances,  and  this 






64  Regulation 9 requires an approver to be satisfied, after making reasonable inquiries, that giving effect to 
a spending proposal would be a proper use of Commonwealth resources. ‘Proper use’ in this context 
means ‘efficient, effective, economical and ethical use that is not inconsistent with the policies of the 
Commonwealth’, as specified in section 44 of the FMA Act and FMA Regulation 9. This is often referred 
to as the ‘value for money‘ test. 
65  The CPRs came into force on 1 July 2012, replacing the Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines 
(CPGs). There is no significant difference between the two in respect of the limited tender process 
discussed in this section. 
66  CPRs, paragraph 4.4. 
67  CPGs, paragraph 4.4(b). 
68  The ANAO examined the Regulation 9 advices and approvals to establish the basis on which a limited 
tender process was agreed. The department justified a limited tender approach for most cases on the 
basis that there was only one provider of the product. The CPRs at paragraph 10.3(d) (iii) provide that a 
Commonwealth agency may approach a single entity through a limited tender process ‘where the goods 
and services can be supplied only by a particular business and there is no reasonable alternative or 
substitute…due to an absence of competition for technical reasons’. 
Procurement and Contract Management 
 
ANAO Audit Report No.53 2013–14 
Management of the National Medical Stockpile 
 
53 
Table 3.1: Procurement processes for current Stockpile contracts 
 Open Tender Limited Tender 
Number of contracts 13 18 
Total value on contracts Approx $25.7 million Approx $62.9 million 
Source: Department of Health. 
Note: The current contracts examined by the ANAO as part of this audit were generally for a period of 
three years. 
3.8 The ANAO  reviewed  the Regulation  9  approvals  for  the purchase of 
items  for  the  Stockpile  apart  from  one—ACAM  200  smallpox  vaccine.  The 
department advised  the ANAO  that  it was unable  to  locate  the Regulation 9 
approval for the smallpox vaccine which was purchased in 2004. 
3.9 The  Regulation  9  documentation  for  pharmaceutical  items  indicates 
that more  than half of  the entities approached did not submit  tenders, citing 
difficulties in supplying specified volumes or meeting the required submission 
deadlines.  For  PPE,  the  department’s Regulation  9  documentation  indicated 
that  in  two of  the  five open  tenders,  the  successful  tenderer was not able  to 
supply  the  items  and  the  department  entered  into  ‘without  prejudice 
negotiations’ with alternative tenderers. 
3.10 For  the  limited  tender procurements, advice on value  for money was 






involving  a  single  supplier was  that  it  could  not  establish  value  for money 
through a  comparative analysis of  the price and quality of each proposal.  In 
these cases value for money needs to be established by documenting the local 
and overseas market environment and assessing the merits of the procurement 




69  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fairness and Transparency in Purchasing Decisions, August 2007, 
Canberra, p. 5. 
70  The ANAO examined a sample of nine FMA Regulation 9 approvals from limited tender processes 
involving sole providers. 
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 only  two procurement approvals explained clearly  the basis on which 
pharmaceutical items had been selected;  
 no  explanation  was  provided,  in  any  of  the  approvals,  as  to  the 
appropriateness of the quantities purchased; and 
 only  two  approvals  provided  a  more  detailed  consideration  of  costs 
and  this  involved  securing discounts  from  suppliers; and none of  the 
other  approvals  considered  costs  in  establishing  a  case  for  ‘value  for 
money‘.  
3.12 In  the  case  of  the  13  open  tender  processes,  tenders were  subject  to 
evaluation  and  ranking  by  a  departmental  panel  according  to  previously 
approved  criteria, and advice  regarding value  for money was based on, and 
consistent with, the panel’s recommendations for the preferred tender.  
3.13 The  procurement  process  for  H5N1  vaccine  involved  a  complex 
combination  of  open  and  limited  tender  procurement  processes.  The 
procurement  process  resulted  in  three  separate  suppliers  signing  contracts 
following  an  open  tender  process  run  by  the  department  in  2010–11.  The 
intention was  to have  the vaccine delivered by 30  June 2013. However, when 




doses  of  vaccine  from  three  companies  through  three  separate  limited  tender 
processes—including one company involved in the 2010‐11 tender process. 
3.14 Three  separate FMA Regulation  9  financial  approvals were given  for 
the H5N1  vaccine, with  the  anticipated  ‘cost per dose’  varying  between  the 
three  suppliers.  While  the  relevant  Regulation  9  documentation  contained 
advice  on  value  for  money  considerations,  including  the  various  discounts 
offered by  the recommended suppliers,  there was no explanation of why  the 
cost per dose varied or whether a higher cost was offset by some other benefit 
to  the department.  Including  this  information  in  the approval documentation 
would  have  documented  why  the  financial  approver  was  satisfied  that 
contracting with the most expensive supplier was considered value for money 
and a proper use of Commonwealth resources. In the course of the audit, the 
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3.12 In  the  case  of  the  13  open  tender  processes,  tenders were  subject  to 
evaluation  and  ranking  by  a  departmental  panel  according  to  previously 
approved  criteria, and advice  regarding value  for money was based on, and 
consistent with, the panel’s recommendations for the preferred tender.  
3.13 The  procurement  process  for  H5N1  vaccine  involved  a  complex 
combination  of  open  and  limited  tender  procurement  processes.  The 
procurement  process  resulted  in  three  separate  suppliers  signing  contracts 
following  an  open  tender  process  run  by  the  department  in  2010–11.  The 
intention was  to have  the vaccine delivered by 30  June 2013. However, when 




doses  of  vaccine  from  three  companies  through  three  separate  limited  tender 
processes—including one company involved in the 2010‐11 tender process. 
3.14 Three  separate FMA Regulation  9  financial  approvals were given  for 
the H5N1  vaccine, with  the  anticipated  ‘cost per dose’  varying  between  the 
three  suppliers.  While  the  relevant  Regulation  9  documentation  contained 
advice  on  value  for  money  considerations,  including  the  various  discounts 
offered by  the recommended suppliers,  there was no explanation of why  the 
cost per dose varied or whether a higher cost was offset by some other benefit 
to  the department.  Including  this  information  in  the approval documentation 
would  have  documented  why  the  financial  approver  was  satisfied  that 
contracting with the most expensive supplier was considered value for money 
and a proper use of Commonwealth resources. In the course of the audit, the 
department  advised  the  ANAO  that  pricing  differences  were  due  to  the 
different product presentations—some vaccine was purchased in a multi‐dose 
vial form which was cheaper than vaccine packaged as a single dose vial. 
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3.15 The  development  of  an  inventory  selection  framework  by  the 
department  should  assist  with  identifying  the  full  range  of  evidence  to  be 
considered  in  procurement  decisions  for  the  Stockpile.71  This  evidence 
includes:  the  risk  that  the stockpiled  item will address, as  identified  through 
emergency response plans; the clinical evidence base for the item; and market 
factors including supply risks and cost effectiveness considerations. As well as 
encouraging  a  more  systematic  approach  to  procurement  decisions,  the 
inventory  selection  framework would  also provide  a  framework  for making 
and documenting procurement decisions. 
Risk assessment for procurement 
3.16 The  department  developed  procurement  strategies  and  risk 
assessments  for  the  current  contracts,  which  were  reviewed  by  the 




Storage of pharmaceutical items 
3.17 The  ANAO’s  2007–08  audit  identified  a  number  of  issues  with  the 




arrangements  to  a  third‐party  provider.  These  subcontracting  arrangements 
resulted  in  inconsistent  standards  and  practices  that were  poorly  controlled 
through the contract arrangements.74   
3.18 In  February  2007,  the  department  commenced  a  process  of 
consolidating  its  short‐term  storage  contracts  into  longer  term  contracts. The 
department developed  a  procurement  strategy drawing  on  expertise  from  a 
warehousing advisory service, which outlined a number of advantages for the 
department  in procuring a  single  storage provider,  including:  tighter  control 
                                                     
71  As discussed in paragraph 4.19. 
72  Department of Health, ‘Rules and Guidance for Procurement’, p. 3 and p. 40. 
73  Each contract is registered with information on the contractor’s name, product, file number, start and 
finish dates for contract, reporting requirements and contract manager.  
74  ANAO Audit Report No.6 2007–08, Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza Pandemic, p. 92. 
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over  the  conditions  under  which  stock  is  stored  and  deployed;  access  to 
improved  logistics  advice;  economies  of  scale;  and  more  streamlined 
administration.  
3.19 The  ANAO  examined  the  department’s  processes  for  procuring 
pharmaceutical  warehousing  services  for  the  Stockpile  to  establish  whether 
value for money and risk had been considered in the purchasing decision. The 
ANAO also examined the department’s management of the contracts. 




tender  procurement  process  by  seeking  an  expression  of  interest  from  the 
market to provide storage services for the Stockpile’s pharmaceutical items. In 
September  2007,  a Request  for  Tender was  released  by  the  department  and 
three  tender  submissions  were  received  in  October  2007.  A  comparative 
assessment  of  price  and  quality  was  undertaken  by  the  Tender  Evaluation 
Committee which was outlined in the tender evaluation report. As funding for 
this  proposal  crossed  three  financial  years,  an  FMA Regulation  10  approval 
was obtained.75 
3.21  Of  the  three  submissions  received,  only  one  was  assessed  by  the 
department  as  being  fully  compliant  with  the  tender  specifications  and  the 
successful tenderer was subsequently offered a contract on 17 December 2007. 
The contract was executed on 21 October 2010. It took the department almost 
three  years  to  negotiate  the  contract, with  indemnity  issues  being  the main 
point of difference.76 
3.22 The Australian Government’s 2003 indemnity guidelines77 provide that 
government policy  is only  to accept  the risks relating  to an  indemnity  ‘when 
the  expected  benefits,  financial  or  otherwise,  are  sufficient  to  outweigh  the 
                                                     
75  FMA Regulation 10 provides for the Finance Minister or a delegate to agree to expenditure for which 
there is insufficient available appropriation. Agreement is typically required for spending proposals which 
cross financial years.  
76  The successful tenderer sought to remove standard indemnity and liability clauses and replace them 
with clauses that limited its liability for damage or loss of goods, including losses arising from its own 
negligence.  
77  Financial Management Guidance No.6, Guidelines for Issuing and Managing Indemnities, Guarantees, 
Warranties and Letters of Comfort, outline the Australian Government’s policy applicable to FMA Act 
agencies on managing contingent liabilities including approval, recording and reporting obligations. 
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in  the  decision‐making  process;  the  indemnity  is  entered  into  for  sound 
reasons; and the original justification for the decision is available for review. 
3.23 The  department  sought  legal  and  actuarial  advice  on  the  proposed 
changes  to  the  standard  contract  indemnity  clauses  sought by  the  successful 
tenderer. Advice provided by the department’s external legal advisers and the 
Australian Government Actuary was  that  the  changes  sought by  the  storage 
provider  to  the contract were unlikely  to be supported by  the Department of 
Finance. The  contract was  amended  to provide  additional protection  for  the 
Commonwealth  and  incorporate  risk  mitigation  measures,  which  the 
department was advised would be acceptable to the Department of Finance.78 
Management of the contract  
3.24 When  developing  a  contract  it  is  important  to  establish  a  clear  and 
appropriate  statement  of  contract  deliverables  and  an  effective  performance 
management  regime.79 The ANAO  examined  the department’s  contract with 
the  storage  provider  for  pharmaceutical  goods  to  establish  whether  it 
provided: clear and well defined contract deliverables  that  identify standards 
and timeframes; and a basis for monitoring contract outcomes. 
Contract deliverables  
3.25 Clear and transparent contract deliverables underpin effective contract 
management. The ANAO noted  in  its 2007–08 performance audit  report  that 
the Department of Health’s contracts for warehousing in place at the time did 
not provide a clear statement of contract requirements.80  
3.26 In  the  current  audit  the ANAO  assessed  the  2010–14  contract  for  the 
storage of pharmaceutical goods to assess the clarity of the deliverables, which 
include: 
 providing  storage  in  accordance  with  the  manufacturer’s  storage 
instructions for the goods;  
                                                     
78  Comcover approved these changes, which were reflected in the final contract. Regulation 10 agreement 
was obtained for expenditure under the contract. 
79  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Developing and Managing Contracts, 2012, Canberra, p. 16. 
80  ANAO Audit Report No.6 2007–08, Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza Pandemic, 
Canberra, 2007, p. 93. 
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storage  and  handling  of  prescription  material  including  compliance 
with  the  Australian  Code  of  Good  Manufacturing  Practice  for 
Medicinal  Products,  the  Australian  Medical  Device  Requirements 
(ISO 13485) and the Australian Code of Good Wholesaling Practice for 
Medicines in Schedules 2, 3, 4 and 8 (the code)81; 







storage  of  pharmaceutical  goods  were  generally  clear  and  well  defined. 
However, there were no associated performance standards and timeframes for 
these  contract  deliverables—the  basis  of  an  effective  performance  reporting 
regime.  
Performance reporting requirements   
3.28 The Stockpile contains a sizeable quantity of costly items with a limited 
shelf life. While storage for the Stockpile has been outsourced, the department 
relies  on  a  suite  of  performance  and  stock‐control  reports  from  its  service 
provider to manage both the Stockpile and the contract. 
3.29 The  ANAO  assessed  the  current  contract  to  establish  whether  it 
provides a basis  for  the department  to assess  the extent  to which  the storage 
provider  for pharmaceutical goods meets contract requirements. The contract 
requires  a  six‐monthly  report  detailing  the  quantity  of  goods  received  and 
stored at each site; the results of bi‐annual stock counts; any security breaches; 
deployment readiness; and any other relevant performance information.  
3.30 The  storage  provider  for  pharmaceutical  goods  has  not  regularly 
provided  the department with  the six‐monthly performance  reports  required 
under  the  contract.  However,  a  weekly  stock‐on‐hand  report  has  been 
consistently  provided,  which  details  stock  currently  held  and  its  condition. 
                                                     
81  National Coordinating Committee on Therapeutic Goods, Australian Code of Good Wholesaling Practice 
for Medicines, Schedules 2, 3, 4 and 8, 1 April 2011. 
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However,  these  reports do not provide  routine management  information  on 
new stock, damaged and expired stock, and stock movements. 
3.31 The provision of  regular performance  reports enables  the department 
to identify performance trends over time and assess the delivery of contracted 
outcomes.  The  department  should  review  and  clarify  contract  reporting 
arrangements  as  a  basis  for more  effectively monitoring  performance  under 
the contract.82  
3.32 Given the value of the stock, and the need to store pharmaceuticals  in 
controlled  conditions,  consideration  could  also  be  given  to  include  annual 
reporting of the storage provider’s insurance status and periodic reporting on 
the currency of licences required for the storage and handling of goods.83  
Storage of non-pharmaceutical items 
3.33 In  April  2008,  a  second  procurement  process  was  initiated  to 
consolidate the storage of non‐pharmaceutical items held in the Stockpile. The 
department sought an expression of  interest  (EOI)  from  the market  followed 
by  a  select  (prequalified)  tender  process.84  Four  commercial  organisations 
expressed interest and were invited to submit tenders by 22 September 2008, of 
which  two  organisations  responded.  The  Tender  Evaluation  Committee 
identified  issues  with  both  proposals  submitted.  An  independent  financial 
check of one of the organisations identified viability concerns, and the proposal 




82  See paragraph 3.45.  
83  The storage provider for pharmaceutical goods is required to maintain a number of licences which 
comply with the Australian Code of Good Manufacturing Practice for Medicinal Products, the Australian 
Medical Device Requirements and the Australian Code of Good Wholesaling Practice for Therapeutic 
Goods for Human Use. The Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) is responsible for assessing 
compliance with a number of these standards. A 2009 Department of Health internal audit report 
recommended that the department consider whether there is scope to leverage off the audits conducted 
by TGA for a risk based assessment of site inspections. There was no evidence that the department 
was using the TGA audit results to develop risk based monitoring schedules.  
84  Open, select and direct tenders are now referred to as open tender, prequalified tender and limited 
tender, respectively, as of 1 July 2012, following release of new Commonwealth Procurement Rules 
(CPRs) and procurement method descriptions for contract and standing offer notices reported on 
AusTender.  
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The department cited  the positive performance history of  the provider as  the 
reason for directly approaching this particular provider.  
3.34 The  department  assessed  the  proposal  submitted  by  the  provider  as 
meeting  the  revised  specifications.  The  provider  was  offered  a  three  year 
contract at a cost of up to $7.7 million, which was signed on 6 December 2010 
and  was  subsequently  extended  to  30  June  2014.  The  required  FMA 
Regulation 9 and Regulation 10 approvals were obtained. 
Contract for storage of non-pharmaceutical items 
3.35 The ANAO  examined key  elements of  the  contract  for  the  storage of 




contracts  then  in  place  did  not  provide  a  clear  statement  of  contract 
requirements. The  report  recommended  that minimum storage  requirements, 
security  requirements  and  safety  requirements  should  be  specified.86  The 
current contract for the storage of non‐pharmaceutical items has a measurable 
set  of  contract  deliverables  that  identify  minimum  storage  requirements, 
security and pest control requirements for the premises.87   
Performance Reporting  
3.37 To  support  the management  and  assessment of  the performance of  a 
contract,  the  contract deliverables  should be  accompanied by  a performance 
management  regime.  The  contract  should  include  a  balanced  set  of 
performance  measures  against  key  contract  deliverables  that  will  alert  the 
                                                     
85  The department decided to directly source the provider under section 8.33 of the Commonwealth 
Procurement Guidelines 2008, which outlined the specific circumstances under which direct sourcing 
could be undertaken, such as when an approach to market has failed. The department sought internal 
probity advice, which proposed that a formal request for tender process be adopted due to the high 
value of the contract.  
86  ANAO Audit Report No.6 2007–08, Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza Pandemic, 
Canberra, 2007, p. 91. 
87  The external service provider for storage of non-pharmaceutical items from the Stockpile, is not subject 
to the same storage conditions that the external service provider for pharmaceutical items must comply 
with. Specifically, the external service provider for the storage for non-pharmaceutical items is not 
required to hold appropriate licences and certificates for the storage and handling of prescription 
pharmaceuticals. 
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3.38 The  contract  requires  the  external  service  provider  to  provide  the 
department with a monthly inventory report which is to include:  
 item details including product code, batch/serial number; 
 item  manufacture  dates,  expiry  dates  and  information  on  expiring 
items; 






3.39 The  monthly  inventory  report  provides  a  reasonable  basis  for  the 
department  to  manage  the  contract  and  monitor  the  status  of  the  stockpile 
items.  However,  some  performance  information  is  not  being  provided 
monthly,  as  required. Over  time,  the monthly  inventory management  report 
has become a weekly stock‐on‐hand report which provides information on the 
number of pallets stored and is the basis for weekly payments to the external 
service  provider.  This  arrangement  has  evolved  without  a  formal  contract 
variation.  Further,  while  the  inventory  reports  detail  product  description, 
product code, quantity of items and quantity of pallets—and more recently the 
expiry  date  for  some  items—the  reports  do  not  identify  the  date  items  are 
received, item batch/serial numbers (where available), item manufacture dates 
and stock movement.89  
3.40 The  service  provider  for  non‐pharmaceutical  items  informed  the 
ANAO that it provides pest management reports on a six‐monthly basis to the 
department; however  the department was unable  to provide  these  reports  to 
the ANAO. Reports on damaged stock are provided by the service provider on 
an  exception basis, when damage  is  identified. The  service provider has not 
reported  on  insurance  status  or  status  of  expired  goods  on  a monthly  basis 
                                                     
88  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Developing and Managing Contracts, February 2012, Canberra, p. 30. 
89  Not all PPE has a batch or serial number. 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.53 2013–14 
Management of the National Medical Stockpile 
 
62 
although  this  information  is  provided  when  requested.  The  ANAO  was 
advised  by  the  service  provider  that  notwithstanding  the  contract 
requirements,  the  frequency  and  scope  of  the  monthly  inventory  reports  is 
dependent on the Department of Health’s contract manager and whether these 
reports are actually sought.  
3.41 The  inventory  report has  a dual purpose—firstly,  to provide  a  list of 
current  stock  that  the  department  can  use  to  update  its  information 
management  system on  the Stockpile; and  secondly,  to provide performance 
information for monitoring the contract for the storage of non‐pharmaceutical 
items. Rather than relying on ad hoc local arrangements which are potentially 
inconsistent  with  contract  requirements,  there  would  be  merit  in  the 
department considering the formal separation of the inventory report provided 
by  the  service provider  into  two  reports—a  regular  inventory  stock‐on‐hand 
report and a less regular performance report. 
Monitoring of contract performance  
3.42 The annual stocktake conducted by the department provides a further 
basis for monitoring contract performance. The stocktake has two purposes: to 
check  the  accuracy of  the department’s  information on  the Stockpile;  and  to 
identify  any  contract management  issues.  The  stocktake  involves  physically 
checking  stock  against  departmental  records,  identifying  any  variation  and 






3.43 Significant  contract  management  issues  were  identified  during  the 
2011–12 and 2012–13 stocktakes, concerning the storage of non‐pharmaceutical 
items  in  warehouses  in  two  states  under  subcontracted  arrangements.  The 
department’s  contract  for  non‐pharmaceutical  items  makes  provision  for 
subcontracting arrangements with departmental approval. However,  there  is 
an  ambiguity  in  the  contractor’s  Business  Continuity  Plan  about  the  exact 
nature of  subcontracting  arrangements  and whether  it  is  consistent with  the 
department’s  contract  provisions.  In  view  of  these  inventory  management 
issues—which have now been  identified over  two years  in  two  states—there 
would be merit in the department clarifying the character of the arrangements 
entered  into  by  the  external  service  provider,  and  whether  departmental 
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approvals  are  required  under  the  subcontracting  provisions  of  the  contract. 
The department advised  the ANAO  that  it has  recently approved  the use of 




are  satisfying  contracted  requirements.  The  department  should  review 
reporting  processes  to  gain  additional  assurance  that  all  contracted 
performance reporting requirements are being met.  
Recommendation No.2  
3.45 To gain additional assurance that contract requirements are being met, 
the  ANAO  recommends  that  the  Department  of  Health  review  and  clarify 

















the key  issue of value  for money was generally  limited;  focusing on  concerns 
that existing stocks of  the  relevant pharmaceuticals were  reaching  their expiry 
date  and  required  replacement  to  maintain  the  Commonwealth’s  capacity  to 
respond to health threats.  
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The  tenders were subject  to evaluation and  ranking by a departmental panel 
according  to  previously  approved  criteria,  and  advice  regarding  value  for 
money was based  on,  and  consistent with,  the panel’s  recommendations  for 
the preferred tender.  
3.51 The  ANAO’s  2007–08  audit  identified  a  number  of  issues  with  the 
department’s storage contract arrangements  for  the Stockpile. Subcontracting 
arrangements had  resulted  in  inconsistent  standards and practices  that were 
poorly  controlled  through  the  contract  arrangements.  The  department 
responded through a process which consolidated short‐term storage contracts 
into  two  longer  term  contracts  relating  to  pharmaceutical  items  and  to 
non‐pharmaceutical  items.  An  open  tender  process  was  conducted  for  the 
storage  of  pharmaceutical  items,  with  three  submissions  received  and  one 
submission  assessed  as  fully  compliant.  While  the  successful  tenderer  was 
offered  a  contract  in  December  2007,  the  contract  was  not  executed  until 
October 2010, some three years later, due to differences over indemnity issues. 
A  second  tender,  to  consolidate  the  storage  of  non‐pharmaceutical  items, 
attracted  two  submissions  but  issues  identified  by  the  tender  evaluation 
committee  prompted  the  department  to  cease  the  procurement  process  and 
directly procure  the  services of  an  existing warehouse provider on  the basis 
that an approach to the market had failed. The department cited the provider’s 
positive performance  history with  the department  as  the  reason  for directly 
approaching this provider.  
3.52 The  ANAO  also  noted  in  its  2007–08  report  that  the  department’s 
contracts  for  warehousing  in  place  at  that  time  did  not  provide  a  clear 
statement of  contract  requirements.  In  the  current audit  the ANAO assessed 
the 2010–14 contract for  the pharmaceutical warehouse provider to assess the 
clarity  of  contract  deliverables.  While  the  contract  requires  six‐monthly 
performance  reports,  these are not always  submitted  to  the department, and 
the weekly stock‐on‐hand reports received by the department do not provide 
routine  management  information.  Further,  the  bi‐annual  stock  cycle  counts 
and annual visual inspections of the stock, also required under the contract, are 
not  currently  being  carried  out  and  the  outcomes  are  not  reported.  The 
department  should  review  and  clarify  contract  reporting  arrangements  as  a 
basis for more effectively monitoring performance under the contract.  
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3.53 The  contract  for  warehousing  personal  protective  equipment  has  a 




time,  the monthly  inventory management  report  has  also  become  a weekly 
stock‐on‐hand report. This arrangement has evolved without a formal contract 
variation—an  ad  hoc  approach  which  can  give  rise  to  inconsistency  with 
contract requirements.  
3.54 The  department’s  annual  stocktake  of  warehoused  items  has  two 
purposes:  to  check  the  accuracy  of  its  information  on  the  Stockpile;  and  to 
identify  any  contract management  issues.  The  stocktake  involves  physically 
checking  stock  against  departmental  records,  identifying  any  variation  and 
accounting  for  those variations. Significant contract management  issues were 
identified  during  the  2011–12  and  2012–13  stocktakes,  concerning  the 
management  of  Stockpile  inventory  in  two  warehouses.  The  department 
advised  the  ANAO  that  it  has  recently  approved  alternative  sites  for  these 
warehouses  and  the  relevant  contracts  have  been  varied  to  reflect  the  new 
arrangements.  
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4.1 The ANAO  observed  in  its  2007–08  performance  audit  that  effective 
inventory management  requires processes and systems  to ensure  the content 




4.2 This  chapter  focuses  on  the  level  of  assurance  provided  by  the 
department’s inventory management of the Stockpile through: 
 selecting  items  for  the  Stockpile  on  the  basis  of  a  planned  approach 
informed by clinical evidence and appropriate advice; and  
 using  inventory management and  information systems that effectively 
track stock and accurately record inventory status. 
Selecting the Stockpile inventory  
Phase 1: Establishing and reviewing the CBRN inventory  
4.3 Since  it was established  in 2002, the Stockpile has grown substantially 
from a relatively small resource intended to deal with chemical, biological and 
nuclear  threats  and  terrorist  activity.  Today,  the  Stockpile  is  dominated  by 
products associated with human influenza preparedness. The development of 
the Stockpile can be separated  into three distinct phases: the establishment of 
the  Stockpile  in  2002;  a  pandemic  preparedness  phase;  and  a  post‐2009 
pandemic phase, which has required consideration of  issues relating  to stock 
expiry,  reform  and  review  processes.  Figure  4.1  outlines  key  events  and 
management responses in the development of the Stockpile. 
                                                     
90  ANAO Audit Report No.6 2007–08, Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza Pandemic, p. 96. 
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11 September 2001  terrorist attacks  in  the United States and  the 2001 anthrax 
letter attacks in the United States—to advise on the development and contents 
of  the  Stockpile  and  emerging  threats.  Since  that  time  the  department  has 
periodically reviewed the evidence base for the Stockpile.91 
4.5 The department has completed two reviews of the CBRN components 
of  the  Stockpile,  in  200492  and  2008.93  The  2008  review94  assessed  the 
appropriateness of the CBRN contents and was informed by the interim CBRN 
review in 2004. The 2008 review made nine recommendations related to: 
 obtaining  stakeholder agreement on  the purpose of  the Stockpile and 
criteria for including items in the Stockpile;  
 increasing  or  maintaining  inventory  levels  on  specific  items  in  the 
Stockpile;  
 prospective purchases of items and quantities required; and  








91  Following the establishment of the Stockpile in 2002, the CBRN committee continued to advise the 
CMO on Stockpile matters and, in 2004, a Department of Health Infectious Diseases Emergency 
Response working group conducted the first major review of the biological countermeasures in the 
Stockpile and reported to the CMO. The department, through the Australian Health Protection Principal 
Committee, has also produced a Domestic Health Response Plan for CBRN of National Consequence 
which provides a framework and mechanisms for effective national coordination, response and recovery 
arrangements. 
92  The review was conducted by the Department of Health’s Infectious Diseases Emergency Response 
working group in 2004 and was the first major review of the biological countermeasures in the Stockpile.  
93  The department advised that ‘the CBRN reviews undertaken were internal, informal review [activity] that 
was not endorsed, nor recommendations accepted by the Department or key expert advisory bodies. 
The reviews were processes to guide thinking in the context of stockpile replenishment and response 
planning.’ 
94  Department of Health and Ageing, ‘Final Review of National Medical Stockpile’, November 2008.  
95  Refer to paragraph 2.16 for more detail. 
96  In April 2011, the Government tasked the Department of Health with considering and implementing, 
where appropriate, the recommendations of the 2008 review; and to involve the Minister for Health and 
other Ministers where appropriate.  
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Phase 2: Pandemic Preparedness  
4.7 The  initial  stockpiling  of  antivirals  in  Australia  was  carried  out  in  
2003–04  as  a  response  to  increasing  concerns  about  avian  influenza  and  the 
potential  for an  influenza pandemic. The department’s actions  in  stockpiling 
antivirals drew on World Health Organization (WHO) guidance on pandemic 
preparedness, which indicated the effectiveness of antivirals for the prevention 
and  early  treatment  of  influenza.  In  its  2007–08  audit  the ANAO  concluded 
that Australia had addressed the minimal and desirable elements of the WHO 
planning  framework  for  a  pandemic  including  stockpiling  of  influenza 
antivirals.97 At the time, Australia had one of the highest per capita stockpiles 
of influenza antivirals in the world at nearly 44 per cent of the population.98 
4.8 The  Australian  Health  Management  Plan  for  Pandemic  Influenza 
(AHMPPI) is the agreed basis on which the national health sector responds to 
pandemic  influenza.99  As  part  of  the  planning  process  associated  with  the 
AHMPPI,  the department has done  relevant work  to  obtain  evidence which 
informs  the  selection  of  appropriate  levels  of  antiviral  coverage  for  the 
Stockpile.100  In  particular,  this  work  has  informed  decision‐making  on  the 
minimum quantity of items in the Stockpile needed to minimise the severity of 
the assessed risk. 
4.9 The ANAO  examined  the  department’s  recent  evidence  gathering  to 





97  ANAO Audit Report No.6 2007–08, Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza Pandemic, p. 19. 
98  ibid., p. 20. 
99  The plan was first developed in 2006 and was revised in 2008 and 2009. It was further revised in 2014 
in light of the lessons learned from the 2009 Pandemic.  
100  The department’s Review of Australia’s Health Sector Response to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 also 
recognised the moderate nature of the 2009 pandemic and that the higher demands of a severe 
pandemic made it prudent to review the range and quality of stockpiled goods for an influenza 
pandemic. 
101  A supply chain analysis prepared by consultants in August 2013 reported that in terms of the 
department’s expenditure on key items, the suppliers of antivirals and P2 respirators together accounted 
for 85 per cent of the total Stockpile expenditure on purchases. The total cost of PPE for the Stockpile 
includes the cost to store PPE, which is significant as PPE items represent 59.9 per cent of the total 
volume of the Stockpile.  
102  The department advised the ANAO that several other literature and evidence reviews have been 
commissioned which have been used as reference material in drafting the revised AHMPPI, in particular 
Part 3 which relates to decision support and evidence collection. 
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4.10 The Department of Health  contracted  the University of Melbourne  to 
undertake  antiviral  modelling  to  inform  the  evidence  base  for  the  revised 
AHMPPI.  The  purpose  of  the  modelling  was  to  assist  in  determining  the 
coverage and quantities of antivirals required for the Stockpile. The reports on 
this modelling were delivered between June 2012 and June 2013.  
4.11 These studies  identified  the number of doses required  for an antiviral 
stockpile  to  achieve  a particular  level of  coverage103  and  a  range of  effective 
inventory  levels of antivirals, depending upon  the prevention and  treatment 
strategy selected and modelled.104  
4.12 The  focus of  this work on  antivirals has been  for  adults. The ANAO 
examined departmental  records on epidemiological modelling and  inventory 
levels  and  did  not  observe  specific  analysis  informing  paediatric  antiviral 
inventory  levels. This  issue arose  in  the context of  the 2011 Strategic Review, 
which recommended  that  ‘the  level of paediatric antiviral supplies should be 
reviewed by  the department  (using  epidemiological modelling)  to  ensure an 
appropriate inventory level and cost effectiveness’.105 The department advised 
the  ANAO  that  the  recommendation  has  not  yet  been  implemented  as  the 
relevant  manufacturer  has  only  recently  recommenced  production.  The 
department  further  advised  that  it  will  commence  a  review  in  2015  of  the 
paediatric inventory.106 
PPE modelling  
4.13 The  department  also  commissioned  research  which  estimated  PPE 
usage  and  inventory  levels  for  the  Stockpile, with  a  final  report  received  in 
December 2013. The report concluded: ‘with full cohorting, a PPE stockpile of 
                                                     
103  The study determined that an antiviral stockpile of approximately eight million doses ‘was generally 
sufficient to enable continuous pre-exposure coverage of frontline workers, along with a targeted 
post-exposure treatment and prophylaxis strategy’. 
104  Murdoch Children’s Research Institute and University of Melbourne, ‘Interim Report on Simulation 
Modelling: Mathematical Modelling of Antivirals for a Public Health Response to an Influenza Pandemic’, 
June 2013, pp. 4–6. 
105  Department of Finance, ‘Review of the National Medical Stockpile’, 2011, Canberra, p.16. 
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Modelling: Mathematical Modelling of Antivirals for a Public Health Response to an Influenza Pandemic’, 
June 2013, pp. 4–6. 
105  Department of Finance, ‘Review of the National Medical Stockpile’, 2011, Canberra, p.16. 
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such  as  the model  of  care  adopted,  assumptions  about  how  PPE  is  used  in 
health care settings, and the transmissibility of the influenza strain.108 
4.15 The model of care used in the research was based on a ‘cohorted’ model 
involving  General  Practice  clinics  and  influenza  hospitals  dedicated  to 
pandemic  treatment. The main  implication  of  the  selected model  of  care  on 
estimates of PPE required in a pandemic is that the cost of PPE is significantly 
reduced  if health care  is delivered  in a cohorted model.109 The model of care 
affects  the  selection  and  amount  of PPE  required  for  the  Stockpile,  and will 




and  quantities  purchased  to  maintain  the  currency  and  capability  of  the 
Stockpile are informed by appropriate evidence.111 
Phase 3: Inventory management since the 2009 Pandemic  
4.17 The  expiry  of  stock  and  the  need  to  replenish  items  to  maintain 
operational  capability  has  emerged  as  a  key  issue  in  the  management  of 
stockpile  inventory  in Australia  and  around  the world. The pharmaceuticals 
and nearly all other Stockpile  items have a  finite  shelf  life which means  that 
they may need  to be disposed of  at  the  end of  that  life without being used. 
Further, the storage of expired stock incurs a cost.112 
4.18 The  2011  Strategic Review  identified  significant  costs  associated with 
expiring stock and the lack of cost‐effectiveness analysis in the selection of the 
                                                     
107  The Australian National University, University of Adelaide and University of Melbourne, ‘Final Report on 
Estimated PPE Usage and Stockpiling Requirements’, Department of Health, December 2013, p. 4. 
108  For example, a low-transmissibility pandemic grows slowly and requires a larger volume of PPE as the 
pandemic persists for longer.  
109  Based on the health care model used in the 2009 pandemic, the PPE non-cohorted total cost was 
estimated at $63.6 million compared to $28.2 million for a PPE cohorted total cost. 
110  For example, the ANAO observed that one state’s stockpile contained predominantly surgical masks 
and it was therefore reliant upon the national Stockpile for its supplies of P2 respirators. 
111  The department advised that the modelling would also be a key input into considering required quantities 
as part of proposed new stockpiling arrangements between the Commonwealth and the states. 
112  See paragraph 2.29. 
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Stockpile’s  inventory  and  quantities.  The  main  focus  of  the  department’s 
activities  since  the Strategic Review has been on  replenishing expiring  stock, 
responding to the review’s recommendations and management reform. 
4.19 The  department  has  commenced  development  of  a  more  systematic 
approach  to  selecting  items  for  the  Stockpile.  An  inventory  selection 
framework has been drafted by the department that identifies a range of issues 
that  should  be  considered  when  determining  the  items  (and  quantities)  for 
inclusion  in  the Stockpile. When finalised,  the framework should provide  the 
basis  for  a  more  systematic  approach  to  selecting  the  Stockpile  inventory, 
including CBRN items.  
4.20 In  order  to  maintain  the  operational  capability  of  the  Stockpile,  the 
department  monitors  the  expiry  dates  of  Stockpile  items  and  has  sought 
additional  funding  to  replenish  expiring  stocks  through  the  annual  Budget 
process.  
Improving Stockpile management 
4.21 In  April  2011,  following  the  2011  Strategic  Review,  the  Australian 
Government  tasked  the  Department  of  Health  and  the  National  Medical 
Stockpile  Interdepartmental Steering Committee  (IDSC)  to explore a range of 




Shelf life extension  
4.22 The 2011 Strategic Review found that there were ‘considerable savings 
to be found in adopting shelf life extension where products are stable and risks 
can  be mitigated’.113 An  effective  shelf  life  extension  program,  involving  an 
acceptable  level  of  risk,  has  the  potential  to  reduce  the  capital  cost  of 
stockpiling  pharmaceuticals,  and  given  the dominance  of  these  items  in  the 
capital cost of the Stockpile overall, could deliver significant savings. 
4.23 The  IDSC‘s  meeting  records  for  2011  and  2012  indicate  that  the 
committee  examined  the  use  of  expired  stock  and  shelf  life  extension. 
                                                     
113  Department of Finance, ‘Review of the National Medical Stockpile’, February 2011, Canberra, p.10.  
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113  Department of Finance, Review of the National Medical Stockpile, February 2011, Canberra, p.10.  
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However,  consideration  of  these  issues  ended with  the  IDSC meeting  of  24 
August  2012,  with  the  minutes  recording  that:  ‘the  Department  will  not 
implement the proposed model noting that significant liability issues, potential 





Cycling or rotating Stockpile stock 
4.25 The 2011 Strategic Review also considered the possibility of cycling or 
rotating  Stockpile  items  to:  minimise  waste;  minimise  storage  and  disposal 
costs;  and  reduce  the  need  for  regular  replenishment.  There  are  a  range  of 
market  factors  and  sensitivities  that  determine  the  cost‐effectiveness  or 
viability  of  rotating  stock.  For  instance,  only  some  stockpile  items  could  be 
cycled through state hospital supply chains or Defence’s supply chains.  
4.26 The department engaged an external consultant to examine the supply 
chains and operational model  for  the Stockpile. The  consultant’s 2013  report 
identified potential to rotate some stockpile items through the supplier’s stock; 
particularly  antibiotics  and  some  PPE.114  Currently  the  department  has 
arrangements  for stock rotation  through suppliers  for some antibiotics and  it 
was  considered possible  to  rotate 10–15 per cent of P2  respirators. However, 
the savings estimated over a 10 year period for P2 respirator rotation were less 
than one per cent; and  for  the antibiotic, amoxicillin, were also  less  than one 




assigned  a  ‘high’  risk  rating.  That  said,  the  report  listed  a  number  of  risk 
mitigation  strategies  including:  conducting  negotiations  with  potential 
suppliers  to  agree  on  contractual  terms  and  conditions;  having  appropriate 
information systems to track items and destination locations in real‐time which 
are  accessible  to  the  department  during  an  emergency;  and  undertaking 
                                                     
114  CBRN items were not considered to be viable for rotation as they were specialised items that were not 
in general use.  
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very  high  compared  to  overall  Australian  market  demand,  thus  preventing 
effective  rotation  of Tamiflu.116  Similarly,  there was no Australian market  to 
enable  rotation  of  Relenza  and  relabelling  requirements  prevented  product 
entry into other markets.117 
Other strategies to reduce cost  
4.28 The  department  has  identified  a  number  of  opportunities  to  reduce 
costs  in  respect  to  specific  stockpile  items. The department  advised  that  the 
Australian  Government  purchased  Tamiflu  at  a  government  price  offered 
worldwide  by  the manufacturer, Roche, which was  less  than  the  price  paid 
commercially for the product. The department also participated  in a program 
offered  by Roche  to  return  some  of  its  expired Tamiflu  bulk powder  to  the 
manufacturer  and  received  new  Tamiflu  capsules  at  approximately  half  the 
cost of new product. The department’s second and  final exchange of Tamiflu 
bulk  powder  was  completed  in  2014.  While  there  may  be  opportunities  to 
purchase  antivirals  at  a  better  price  into  the  future  (Relenza  will  come  off 
patent  from  2014  and  Tamiflu  from  2016),  the  department  has  advised  that 
there is no guarantee when or if a generic product will come onto the market.118  
4.29 The  2011  Strategic Review  identified  opportunities  to  reduce  storage 
costs,  observing  that  the Department  of Health was paying  to  store  expired 
stockpile  items.119  The  department  has  advised  that  it  has  conducted 
progressively  larger  destruction  programs  to  assist  in  reducing  the  costs  of 
storing expired items.120  
                                                     
115  Ernst & Young, ‘Supply Chain and Logistical Operating Model Review’, August 2013, p.59 
116  This was advised by the manufacturer of Tamiflu, (Roche), to Ernst & Young. 
117  This was advised by the manufacturer of Relenza, (GlaxoSmithKline), to Ernst & Young.  
118  The department also advised that regulatory processes can mean long lead times for new products 
emerging onto the market. The department has estimated that the market may take two to three years 
to settle following a patent expiration. There are also a number of new antivirals currently undergoing 
clinical trials that may in the future prove more efficacious. 
119  For example, storage costs for expired items in 2010–11 were $160 000. It should be noted that expired 
items are not disposed of until replenishment has occurred. Hence expired stock will incur storage 
costs. 
120  In 2012–13 the department disposed of stock valued at $57 453 224 compared to $10 111 076 in 2011–12 
and $1 166 396 in 2010–11. 
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116  This was advised by the manufacturer of Tamiflu, (Roche), to Ernst & Young. 
117  This was advised by the manufacturer of Relenza, (GlaxoSmithKline), to Ernst & Young.  
118  The department also advised that regulatory processes can mean long lead times for new products 
emerging onto the market. The department has estimated that the market may take two to three years 
to settle following a patent expiration. There are also a number of new antivirals currently undergoing 
clinical trials that may in the future prove more efficacious. 
119  For example, storage costs for expired items in 2010–11 were $160 000. It should be noted that expired 
items are not disposed of until replenishment has occurred. Hence expired stock will incur storage 
costs. 
120  In 2012–13 the department disposed of stock valued at $57 453 224 compared to $10 111 076 in 2011–12 
and $1 166 396 in 2010–11. 
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Stockpile inventory management systems 
4.30 Information management  systems  can  contribute  to  the  efficient  and 
effective  management  of  the  Stockpile  by  providing  accurate  and  timely 
information  on  stock  levels,  status  (condition  and  expiry  information)  and 
location.  This  information  is  necessary  for  an  effective  response  to  a  health 
emergency, day‐to‐day management of the stock and longer term planning for 
the Stockpile.  
4.31 The  process  for  linking  together  different  computing  systems  and 
software applications so they operate as a coordinated whole is referred to as 
system  integration.  Well  integrated  systems  deliver  timely  and  accurate 
information. Other benefits include greater efficiency through reduced manual 
intervention  and  consistent  practices.  The  main  information  management 
systems for the Stockpile are outlined in Figure 4.2.  
Figure 4.2: Main Stockpile information management systems 
 
Source: ANAO.  
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range  of  supporting  spreadsheets;  and  external  warehouse  inventory 
management systems used by contractors. 
4.33 Currently,  there  are  no  system  interfaces  to  support  automatic  data 
transmission  between  the  information  management  systems  shown  in 
Figure 4.2.121  Instead,  the  department  relies  on  emails  and  attachments 
(including manual forms and spreadsheets) to transmit key information for the 
operation of  the Stockpile.122 A  report by KPMG  in  2012, which  included  an 
assessment of the Stockpile’s information systems, found that all management 
of  the  Stockpile  required  offline  communication  with  multiple  service 
providers to coordinate inventory movements and operations.  
4.34 To  assess  the  adequacy  of  the  inventory  management  systems  that 




 the Warehouse Management  Systems  (WMS)  used  by  the  two major 
warehouse providers contracted by the department to hold stock.124  
4.35 The  ANAO  also  assessed  the  effectiveness  of  selected  controls  for 
monitoring,  reconciling  and  reporting  on  stock  levels. The ANAO did not 
assess processes for the disposal or destruction of expired stock as disposal 
was the subject of an internal audit by the department in 2012. The internal 
audit  report  identified weaknesses  in  some of  the  controls associated with 
the department’s processes  for disposing of expired stock, such as disposal 
guidelines,  disposal  planning,  stock  reconciliation  and  management 
reporting.125  The  program  area  responsible  for  managing  the  Stockpile 
agreed  to  address  the  six  recommendations  outlined  in  the  internal  audit 
report  by  February  2012,  and  the  department’s  internal  audit  function 
                                                     
121  The department advised that the main reason there has been no system interface is due to lack of 
capacity for security/confidentiality. 
122  The department advised that these emails and attachments are cross-referenced with invoices, 
information from suppliers, disposal contractors and other jurisdictions, depending on the information 
being supplied. 
123  This includes the Stockpile database spreadsheet, the deployment folder, the disposal spreadsheet, 
and the purchases spreadsheet. 
124  The two warehouse providers each use different warehouse management systems to manage their 
stockpile inventories. 
125  Department of Health, ‘Audit of the Management of the Disposal of National Medical Stockpile Expired 
Stock’, Audit Report No.19 of 2011–12, Audit and Fraud Control Branch, January 2012. 
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125  Department of Health, ‘Audit of the Management of the Disposal of National Medical Stockpile Expired 
Stock’, Audit Report No.19 of 2011–12, Audit and Fraud Control Branch, January 2012. 
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advised  the  ANAO  in  May  2014  that  all  recommended  process 
improvements for disposing of expired stock have been fully implemented.  
The Stockpile database 
4.36 The  Stockpile  database  was  custom‐built  in  July  2010  to  support 
inventory  management,  some  eight  years  after  the  establishment  of  the 
Stockpile.  The  database was  designed  as  a  standalone  system  and  does  not 
interface  with  the  department’s  internal  IT  systems  or  those  used  by  the 
warehouse providers.126 
4.37 The ANAO observed that some Stockpile  information  is also recorded 
in spreadsheets that are stored outside of the Stockpile database. There would 
be  benefit  in  reviewing  the  security  and  operational  risks  of  this practice  to 
ensure that the spreadsheets are subject to relevant security and IT controls.  
4.38 A number  of  other  features  of  the database’s design have  limited  its 
functionality  and  useability,  resulting  in  the  need  for  work‐arounds  and 
duplication  of  effort.127  Some  of  the  observed  limitations were  evidenced  by 
practices that included: 
 departmental  staff  using  spreadsheets  from  the  database,  to 
supplement missing functionalities in the database; and  
 managing  the  disposal  process  through  a  master  spreadsheet  which 
manually  combines  information  from  the  Stockpile  database  and 
information from warehouse contractors’ information systems. 
4.39 Information  stored  in  the  Stockpile database  is  based  on  the manual 
entry  of  information  provided  by  warehouse  contractors.  The  quality  and 




126  Both financial information and inventory information were sourced from other systems and then 
manually consolidated and recorded in the Stockpile database. 
127  The department advised the ANAO that only essential software upgrades have been undertaken due to 
limited resources.  
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 the  correction  of  inaccurate  stock  records  which  the  department 
identified through the 2012–13 stocktake; 
 updates  to  the  database  following  a  high  volume  disposal  process 
undertaken in the first half of 2013; and 




the  department  used  to  coordinate  all  disposals,  which  makes  it 
difficult  for  the  department  to  identify  which  information  is 
authoritative; and 
 inconsistencies and errors  from mismatched stock reports  for disposal 
compared with records in the Stockpile database.  
4.42 For example,  the  ‘Main DoH Disposal Spreadsheet 2012–13’  identified 
stock  for  destruction  which  had  not  been  destroyed  according  to 
stock‐on‐hand  reports  provided  by  the  warehouse  contractors.  Part  of  the 
problem  related  to  the  complexity  of  identifying  stock  for  disposal  when 
assembling  the department’s disposal  spreadsheet  from various  sources  and 
then informing the warehouse contractor.  
4.43 The department  relies on  records held  in  the database  to  support  the 
Stockpile’s operation and for management and business level reporting. Delays 
in updating  the database  and  inaccuracies  in data holdings  can  compromise 
the database’s value as an authoritative source of information for management 
and planning purposes. A 2012 consultant’s report found that the department’s 




128  KPMG, ‘Department of Health and Ageing: National Medical Stockpile Migration Project Technology 
Enablers, Final Report’, 2012, p. ix. 
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128  KPMG, ‘Department of Health and Ageing: National Medical Stockpile Migration Project Technology 
Enablers, Final Report’, 2012, p. ix. 
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Warehouse management systems used by external service 
providers  
4.44 The  external  storage  provider  for  non‐pharmaceutical  items 
predominantly  uses  CargoWise—a  commercially  available  warehouse 
management  system  that  supports  warehouse  and  logistics  operations—to 
manage  the  stockpile  inventory  for warehouses  that  it  directly manages,  as 
well as for its three subcontractor warehouses.129 
4.45 CargoWise  is capable of  identifying and  labelling  individual pallets of 
stock, which potentially enables the rapid identification of stockpile items in a 
warehouse.  The  system  can  also:  provide  online  and  real  time  access  to 
information  on  inventory  status;  generate  reports;  and  perform  business 
transactions. However, these capabilities are not used by the contractor for the 
day‐to‐day management of the department’s stockpile items.130 
4.46 Cargowise  can  identify  and  label  each  pallet  of  stockpile  items  by 
creating  and  using  a  unique  identification  number  for  each  pallet  called  a 
Licence Plate Number.131 The external service provider provides Licence Plate 
Numbers  for  other  clients  but  does  not  use  this  functionality  for  the 
department’s  stockpile  items.  Instead,  it  identifies  a  group  of  pallets  of  like 
items with the same product, batch number or expiry date.132 
4.47 At present, the external service provider can identify a common group 
of  stockpile  items but  it  cannot  identify a unique  stockpile pallet. While  this 






reporting,  and  include  a  weekly  spreadsheet—known  as  the  stock‐on‐hand 
report.  The  department  advised  the  ANAO  that  it  was  not  aware  of  the 
                                                     
129  The external service provider provides warehouse and logistic support for the non-pharmaceutical items 
in the Stockpile, such as personal protective equipment—gloves, masks, gowns, and other stock such 
as hand cleanser and syringes. 
130  Identifying each pallet of stockpile items is based on its batch number, expiry date and lot number. 
131  Radio frequency device scanning can also be used to associate that unique number with a warehouse 
racking location. 
132  Similar to all the warehouse providers examined by the ANAO, stockpile items are co-located with items 
held on behalf of other customers. 
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existence of an online portal  function, and had  therefore not made use of  the 
full  functionality of  the systems used by  the external service provider.133 The 
department  further  advised  that  future  procurements  will  seek  to  use  this 
capability but with due consideration of appropriate IT security requirements.  
4.49 The  accurate  recording  of  an  expiry  date  for  items  in  the  Stockpile 
facilitates the management of expiring stock. It is also a requirement under the 
contract with the department that the Cargowise system used by the external 
service provider  enables  reporting of  expiry dates.134  Some products  entered 
into  Cargowise  before  January  2012  had  no  expiry  dates  recorded.135  This 
occurred because  the service provider did not capture expiry dates when  the 
items were  first  recorded  in  the  system,  and  it was not possible  to  add  this 
information to a current record at a later date.136 The external service provider 
informed  the ANAO  that  it began  to consistently  record  the expiry dates  for 
stockpile  products  in  CargoWise  from  January  2012.137  Correspondence 
between the department and the external service provider indicates that there 
have  been  efforts  to  improve  the  recording  of  product  expiry  dates  in 
CargoWise.  
Inconsistencies between stock recorded on contractor systems and the 
Stockpile database 
4.50 The  ANAO  examined  inventory  information  kept  by  the  Northern 
Territory based  contractor  that used  a warehouse management  system other 
than  CargoWise  for  managing  stockpile  inventory.138  There  were  some 
inconsistencies  between  the  stock  recorded  in  the  contractor’s  warehouse 
management  system,  in  CargoWise,  and  in  the  department’s  Stockpile 
                                                     
133  The contract states that the service provider must provide the department with access to CargoWise 
and provide instructions and training on the use of the online system and reports. 
134  Department of Health and Ageing, ‘Deed of Variation No. 1: National Warehousing, Logistic Planning 
Support, Transportation and Related Services’, 29 March 2011, p. 3. 
135 As of October 2013, approximately nine per cent (660 pallets out of 7255 pallets) of stock had no expiry 
date or inadequate information for an expiry date to be ascertained. This was based on a CargoWise 
stock-on-hand report. 
136  The external service provider advised the department that to back fill the expiry date information would 
have required the deletion of all current product records, the creation of new product shells, and the  
re-entry of all product records. 
137  Expiry dates were entered into the field for ‘description’ of the product, or sometimes into the field for 
‘lot number’. 
138  There are three warehouse contractors; the Western Australia and South Australia contractors use a 
warehouse management system called Sapphire Logistics, and in the Northern Territory the contractor 
uses a warehouse management system called S2 Logistics. 
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134  Department of Health and Ageing, ‘Deed of Variation No. 1: National Warehousing, Logistic Planning 
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135 As of October 2013, approximately nine per cent (660 pallets out of 7255 pallets) of stock had no expiry 
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database.139 These  inconsistencies  resulted  from  the  contractor  not  recording 
the  location of pallets  in  their warehouse management  system, which meant 
that locations were not being recorded in CargoWise.140  
4.51 While the ANAO’s physical count of selected  items at the contractor’s 
warehouse  matched  the  contractor’s  records,  the  use  of  multiple  systems 
combined with inconsistencies in recording has introduced risks in accounting 
for  stock. The non‐recording  of pallet  locations  in  this particular warehouse 
also represented a risk that stock may not be located when required.  
Warehouse management systems for pharmaceutical stockpiled goods  
4.52 The main inventory management system used by the storage provider 
for  pharmaceutical  goods  is  called  Manhattan—an  off‐the‐shelf  warehouse 
management system primarily designed to control the movement and storage 
of  inventories  within  a  chain  of  warehouses  and  to  process  the  associated 
business transactions, such as the transporting, receiving, storage, and dispatch 
of stock.141 While Manhattan 9  is  the main and current version, not all of  the 
storage provider’s warehouses were using Manhattan 9. In  June 2013, as part 
of  an  annual  stocktake,  the  department  identified  that  these  arrangements 
introduced risks to data integrity. 
4.53 A  2012  report  on  the  Stockpile’s  information  systems  noted  that  the 
storage  provider  for  pharmaceutical  goods  had  ‘traditionally  maintained 
inventory  manually  in  spreadsheets  and  over  time  have  migrated  this 







139  For example, some Stockpile stock had arrived in the contractor’s warehouse over four weeks prior; it 
was receipted and reported to the service provider and was recorded in CargoWise, but was not in the 
contractor’s warehouse management system, and had not been entered into the Stockpile database. 
140  The contractor had also begun to use different units to measure ‘items on hand’. Rather than recording 
the number of cartons, the number of individual units was recorded. Similarly, a stock item ‘goggles’ was 
recorded in the contractor’s warehouse management system and in CargoWise as 47 cartons, however 
in the Stockpile database it was recorded as 15 cartons and 6768 items. 
141  Manhattan 9 uses the automatic identification of goods and data-capture technology—such as bar code 
scanning. It is also integrated with other advanced technology for real-time monitoring and tracking of 
goods in movement. 
142  KPMG, ‘Department of Health and Ageing: National Medical Stockpile Migration Project Technology 
Enablers, Final Report’, 2012, p. 19. 
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4.54 In  the  course  of  an  annual  stocktake  in  July  2013,  the  department 
identified  that  warehouses  used  to  store  pharmaceutical  goods  for  the 







integrity  issues,  the ANAO  conducted  a  spot  check  of  the data  in  a backup 




4.56 The  service  provider  for  pharmaceutical  goods  informed  the  ANAO 
that all warehouses went live with Manhattan 9 in December 2011. However, a 
departmental  document  produced  by  the  service  provider143  indicated  that 
stock  storage  information  is  stored  on  an  Excel  spreadsheet. Duplicate  data 
systems have the potential to affect the integrity of Stockpile information. 
4.57 The  department  advised  the  ANAO  that  each  week  a  stock‐on‐hand 
report  is  downloaded  into  a  Microsoft  Excel  spreadsheet  and  emailed  to  the 
department. The department uses a standalone stockpile database to manage the 





Access controls for warehouse management systems 
4.58 The  inventory  management  systems  used  by  warehouse  service 
providers have a built‐in security component which can restrict user access to 
information; a control that can help preserve data integrity. Different types of 
users have different  level of access  to  the  information held  in  the warehouse 
management  systems  through  information  segregation.  The  ANAO  was 
                                                     
143  Department of Health, ‘Stock Deployment Procedure’, 25 February 2013. 
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advised  by  the  two  service  providers  that when  external  customers  interact 
with  their respective warehouse management systems  (either Manhattan 9 or 
CargoWise), via an online portal or more advanced  integrated  systems,  they 
may only access data related to their own inventory. The department advised 
the ANAO that the use of a shared online portal, particularly one which other 
organisations  may  access,  presents  security  risks  that  would  need  to  be 
considered before an online portal is used for the Stockpile. 
Effectiveness of data integrity controls  
4.59 Accuracy  of  data  is  the  extent  to which  it  is  free  from  errors.144 Data 
integrity  describes  the  reliability  of  the  data,  and  whether  it  is  current  and 
relevant.145  
4.60 To  assess  the  effectiveness  of  the  controls  over  data  quality  in  the 
various information management systems relating to the Stockpile, the ANAO:  





 compared  records held  in  the Stockpile database with  records held  in 
the warehouse management  systems of  external  service providers  for 
pharmaceutical and non‐pharmaceutical goods; and  
 validated  records  held  within  the  internal  systems  and  warehouse 
management  systems  of  service  providers  for  pharmaceutical    and  
non‐pharmaceutical  goods  (including  the  use  of  spreadsheets  by  the 
service provider for pharmaceutical goods).  
4.61 As discussed,  the ANAO  identified a number of data  integrity  issues 
including: 
 data discrepancies between information held in the deployment folder, 
when  compared  with  the  Stockpile  database  records  and  with  the 
results of the 2012–13 stocktake146;  
                                                     
144  Data accuracy refers to whether the data values stored for an object are the correct values. To be correct, 
a data value must be the right value and must be represented in a consistent and unambiguous form.  
145  Data quality is dependent on data accuracy and integrity. 
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4.54 In  the  course  of  an  annual  stocktake  in  July  2013,  the  department 
identified  that  warehouses  used  to  store  pharmaceutical  goods  for  the 







integrity  issues,  the ANAO  conducted  a  spot  check  of  the data  in  a backup 




4.56 The  service  provider  for  pharmaceutical  goods  informed  the  ANAO 
that all warehouses went live with Manhattan 9 in December 2011. However, a 
departmental  document  produced  by  the  service  provider143  indicated  that 
stock  storage  information  is  stored  on  an  Excel  spreadsheet. Duplicate  data 
systems have the potential to affect the integrity of Stockpile information. 
4.57 The  department  advised  the  ANAO  that  each  week  a  stock‐on‐hand 
report  is  downloaded  into  a  Microsoft  Excel  spreadsheet  and  emailed  to  the 
department. The department uses a standalone stockpile database to manage the 





Access controls for warehouse management systems 
4.58 The  inventory  management  systems  used  by  warehouse  service 
providers have a built‐in security component which can restrict user access to 
information; a control that can help preserve data integrity. Different types of 
users have different  level of access  to  the  information held  in  the warehouse 
management  systems  through  information  segregation.  The  ANAO  was 
                                                     
143  Department of Health, ‘Stock Deployment Procedure’, 25 February 2013. 
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 some  discrepancies  in  one  of  the  warehouses  between  Manhattan  9 
records  held  by  the  external  service  provider  and  its  warehouse 
spreadsheet; and  
 systems  and  processes  being  used  to  manage  the  department’s 
stockpile  inventory,  specifically  the  use  of  Manhattan  9  and 
spreadsheets  by  the  external  service  provider  for  pharmaceutical 
goods, may be contributing to data integrity issues.  
4.62 Taken  together,  the range of  issues  identified by successive reviews—
including  this  audit,  the  2012  KPMG  information  technology  report148 
commissioned  by  the  department  and  the  2011  Strategic  Review—indicates 
that the department should review its information management arrangements 
for the transfer of Stockpile data. 









146  The ANAO observed that the deployment folder was not up-to-date. Six out of 25 influenza items 
contained inaccuracies, in particular listing expired stock; and six out of 19 CBRN items contained 
inaccuracies, in particular listing expired stock. 
147  There were discrepancies between the Stockpile database records and stock-on-hand reports provided 
by the external service provider for storage of pharmaceutical items. These related to stock identified for 
destruction by the department which had not been destroyed according to the records of the storage 
provider. There were some inconsistencies in the recording of stock across warehouse management 
systems used by the external service provider (and its contractors) and the Stockpile database. These 
included the non-recording of pallet locations and the use of different units of measurement. These 
represent a risk that stockpile items may not be able to be located when required. 
148  KPMG, ‘Department of Health and Ageing: National Medical Stockpile Migration Project Technology 
Enablers, Final Report’, 2012. 
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destruction by the department which had not been destroyed according to the records of the storage 
provider. There were some inconsistencies in the recording of stock across warehouse management 
systems used by the external service provider (and its contractors) and the Stockpile database. These 
included the non-recording of pallet locations and the use of different units of measurement. These 
represent a risk that stockpile items may not be able to be located when required. 
148  KPMG, ‘Department of Health and Ageing: National Medical Stockpile Migration Project Technology 
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The annual stocktake as a key control for data integrity  
4.66 Currently,  the department  relies on one key  control  to maintain data 
integrity—the annual stocktake conducted by the department and an external 
contractor.  The  department  conducts  an  annual  stocktake  in  order  to  gain 
assurance  that  its  stockpile  records  reflect  the  true  status of  the  inventory at 
warehouse  level, and  to ensure  that warehouse contractors are  fulfilling  their 
contractual obligations  in  storing  the  stock.  Information  collected during  the 
stocktake  is  subsequently  used  to  adjust  information  management  system 
records—such as the Stockpile database.  
4.67 The  Department  of  Health’s  2012–13  stocktake  identified  that 
54 799 143  stockpile  items  were  present,  and  of  these,  53 303 186  were 
identified in the Stockpile database. This represents a variance of 1.96 per cent 
of  items  identified  but  not  recorded  in  the  Stockpile database. The  variance 
indicates  that  there are some  risks  in  relying on  the Stockpile database as an 
authoritative source of information. 
4.68 In reporting the results of the 2012–13 stocktake, the external contractor 
stated  that  ‘the  majority  of  items  in  the  Stockpile  counted  in  the  stocktake 
correlated  to  the department’s  inventory records. A minor range of variances 
was detected’, and recommended that the department should ‘establish formal 
reconciliation  processes  prior  to  stocktake  visits  so  that  updates  to  the 
department’s  and  warehouse  inventory  management  systems  ensure  any 
potential  variances  are  addressed  in  a  timely  manner’.149  The  department 








development of criteria  for  item selection and pre‐deployment of CBRN  items 
with state governments.  
                                                     
149  Ernst & Young, ‘National Medical Stockpile Stocktake 2012–13’, Department of Health and Ageing, 
30 June 2013, pp. 1,2. 
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4.70 The  initial  stockpiling  of  antivirals  in  Australia  was  carried  out  in  
2003–04  as  a  response  to  increasing  concerns  about  avian  influenza  and  the 
potential  for  an  influenza pandemic.  In  its  2007–08  audit  report,  the ANAO 
concluded that Australia had addressed the minimal and desirable elements of 
the  WHO  planning  framework  for  a  pandemic  including  stockpiling  of 
antivirals.  In  the  current  audit  the  ANAO  examined  the  Department  of 
Health’s recent evidence gathering to support decisions for inventory selection 
and  the  quantity  of  antivirals  and  PPE  purchased  in  preparation  for  an 
influenza  pandemic.  The  department  has  commissioned  two  modelling 
projects—one on antivirals and one on PPE—to inform its consideration of the 
evidence base for the pandemic component of the Stockpile. The department’s 
approach  is  intended  to  provide  assurance  that  the  items  and  quantities 
purchased  to  maintain  the  currency  and  capability  of  the  Stockpile  are 
informed by appropriate evidence.  
4.71 The  2011  Strategic Review  identified  significant  costs  associated with 
expiring stock and the lack of cost‐effectiveness analysis in the selection of the 
Stockpile’s  inventory  and  quantities.  The  main  focus  of  the  department’s 
activities  since  the  Strategic Review has been on  replenishing  expiring  stock 
and  responding  to  the  review’s  recommendations.  The  department  has 
commenced development of a more systematic approach to selecting items for 
the  Stockpile,  including  a  draft  inventory  selection  framework.  The 
Department of Health and stakeholder agencies have also explored a range of 
strategies to reduce Stockpile management costs, including: shelf life extension; 
stock  cycling  and  rotation;  returning  expired  pharmaceuticals  to 
manufacturers  in  return  for  fresh  stock; and purchasing generic antivirals as 
they  become  available.  The  department  has  also  conducted  progressively 
larger destruction programs to reduce the costs of storing expired items.  
4.72 The  ANAO  assessed  the  effectiveness  of  selected  controls  for  the 
management of  the Stockpile,  including processes  for monitoring, reconciling 
and  reporting  on  stock  levels.  The  ANAO  did  not  assess  processes  for  the 
disposal or destruction of expired stock as  this was  the subject of an  internal 
audit  by  the  department  in  2012.  The  internal  audit  report  identified 
weaknesses in some of the controls associated with the department’s processes 
for disposing of expired stock, such as disposal guidelines, disposal planning, 
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4.73 The  ANAO  reviewed  controls  for  the  identification,  recording  and 
deployment  of  stock,  with  weaknesses  in  some  controls  resulting  in  data 
integrity  issues.  The  department  relies  on  a  number  of  information 
management systems and processes to administer the Stockpile. In the absence 
of  system  interfaces  to  support  automatic  data  transmission  between  the 
information  management  systems,  the  department  employs  emails  and 
attachments  (including  manual  forms  and  spreadsheets)  to  transmit  key 
information. This has affected the completeness and accuracy of data stored for 
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effective deployment  of  items  to  those  in need. The Australian Government 
has  established  collaborative  arrangements  to  deliver  stockpile  items  to  the 
states and  territories, which have responsibility  to manage and distribute  the 
items within their respective jurisdictions. 
5.2 The department has developed a deployment framework that includes: 
memoranda  of  understanding  (MoUs)  between  the  Australian,  state  and 
territory  governments;  a  departmental  deployment  plan,  policy  and 
procedures150; and contracts with the Stockpile warehouse providers. 
Deployment framework 
5.3 Formal  agreements,  such  as  MoUs,  can  provide  clarity  by  defining 
areas of agreed responsibility between jurisdictions involved in joint activities. 
The Department of Health has entered  into MoUs with all state and  territory 
health  authorities.  They  outline  the  agreed  obligations  of  the  states  and 




5.4 Alongside  the  MoUs,  the  Department  of  Health  has  established  a 
‘National Medical Stockpile Deployment Plan’ and ‘National Medical Stockpile 
Deployment  Procedures’  to  provide  guidance  for  departmental  staff  on  the 
process to be followed for deploying the Stockpile.151 The states and territories 
                                                     
150  Department of Health, Office of Health Protection, National Medical Stockpile Management Policy, 
January 2012; Department of Health, National Medical Stockpile Deployment Plan, December 2012; 
Department of Health, National Medical Stockpile Deployment Procedures, December 2012; and 
Department of Health, Communication Protocols for Deployment of National Medical Stockpile Items, 
August 2012. 
151  The deployment plan, policy and procedures were updated and re-issued during 2012. 
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have  also  developed  stockpile  distribution  plans.  These  documents  are 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Deployment plan and procedures 
5.5 The  department’s  deployment  plan  and  associated  deployment 
procedures were internally reviewed and re‐issued to staff in December 2012. 
The  deployment  plan  describes  the  higher  level  deployment  processes  that 
departmental staff should follow, including how a request should be received 
and approved. The deployment procedures provide  staff with more detailed 
information  on  selecting  items  for  deployment  and  on  engaging  with 
warehouse  and  transport  contractors  to  deploy  items.  Both  the  deployment 
plan  and  deployment  procedures  focus  on  the  department’s  response  to 
requests  for  Stockpile  items  from  state  jurisdictions.  Requests  from 
Commonwealth agencies for deployment or pre‐positioning of stockpile items, 
and  any  requests  for  international  or  extraordinary  deployments,  are 
considered on a case‐by‐case basis.152     
Deployment process 
5.6 The  deployment  process  requires  Office  of  Health  Protection  (OHP) 
staff153,  in  collaboration  with  relevant  jurisdictions,  to  identify  the  stock 
required and the deployment location. The department advises the warehouse 
provider of  the stock  that needs  to be deployed by batch number and expiry 
date. The provider’s warehouse management system  is capable of  identifying 
and  selecting  the oldest unexpired  stock  first  through  a  computer  algorithm 








152  Department of Health, ‘National Medical Stockpile Deployment Plan’, December 2012, pp. 1, 2. 
153  Specifically staff from the Health Emergency Management Branch. 
154  Expiry details of some stock has not been recorded on warehouse management systems.  
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 the  PPE warehouse  provider’s  FIFO  date  resets when  stock  is moved 
from  one  warehouse  to  another  warehouse—an  event  which  has 
occurred in recent years; 
 data  integrity  issues,  arising  from  inconsistencies  between  the 
department’s  information  management  systems  and  warehouse 
provider data; and  
 the warehouse providers  for PPE  and pharmaceutical  items have not 
consistently labelled stock with a physical label, attached to each pallet, 
which includes expiry details.155 
5.8 During  the  course  of  the  audit,  the  non‐pharmaceutical  warehouse 
contractor acknowledged that some of its pallet labelling was inconsistent with 





a  warehouse  during  the  2011–12  stocktake  and  took  action  in  June  2013  to 
select  a  new  warehouse  contractor.  Further,  the  ANAO’s  inspection  of  a 
Northern Territory warehouse in September 2013 indicated that the warehouse 
contractor  was  not  recording  pallet  locations  in  its  WMS  and  that  the 
department was not aware of this. 
5.10 To manage  the potential risks arising  from  inadequate pallet  labelling 
and  recording,  there  would  be  benefit  in  the  department  appropriately 
monitoring pallet labelling and the recording of pallet locations by warehouse 
contractors, to improve contract compliance. 
State stockpile distribution plans 
5.11 The  MoUs  provide  that  states  and  territories  (states)  will  distribute 
Stockpile  items  in  accordance  with  a  distribution  plan  developed  by  each 
jurisdiction,  consistent with  their  responsibility  for  the management  of  their 
respective  health  delivery  systems  and  their  operational  responsibility  for 
distributing stockpile items. 
                                                     
155  The contracts require warehouse contractors to affix such labels which provide the: product code and 
description, batch number (where available), quantity on the pallet, expiry date, and the words ‘Property 
of the Australian Government—Department of Health’. In addition, the pharmaceutical warehouse 
contractor is required to include on the label the total loaded weight of each pallet. 
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5.12 In  its  2007–08  audit  report,  the  ANAO  observed  that  for  the 
deployment arrangements to be effective, the national and jurisdictional plans 
needed  to be well‐integrated  and underpinned by  cooperative planning  and 
information sharing. The ANAO also observed that while the department had 
received  individual  jurisdictional plans, some were several years old and had 
not been reviewed by  the department, and some were  in draft  form and had 
not been finalised.156  
5.13 In  November  2013,  the  ANAO  examined  the  MoUs  and  state 
distribution plans, which  are  a  specific  requirement of  the MoUs. All MoUs 
were current, having been updated in 2010, consistent with the requirement to 
conduct  a  review  every  five  years.  However,  the  department  held  current 
distribution plans for only four of the eight jurisdictions. During the course of 
the  audit,  one  jurisdiction  advised  the ANAO  that  it  intended  to  review  its 





5.14 Effective  stakeholder  engagement  facilitates  both  planning  and  the 
successful  deployment  of  the  Stockpile.  This  theme  was  reiterated  by  key 
stakeholders  interviewed  by  the  ANAO,  including  Chief  Health  Officers 
(CHOs), the warehouse contractors, and professional associations. 
5.15 The  ANAO  interviewed  senior  managers  and  representatives  of  the 
CHOs for four jurisdictions and a senior representative of the Royal Australian 
College  of General  Practitioners;  all  reported  favourably  on  the  quality  and 
effectiveness of the working relationships developed by departmental officers 
and the Commonwealth’s Chief Medical Officer (CMO). 
Administration of deployment processes and procedures 
5.16 The department monitors  international health  threats and may obtain 
advance notice of developing pandemics and emergencies  through  its Health 
Surveillance section. A state or  territory may also advise  the department of a 
potential  health  emergency.  Depending  on  the  threat,  the  department  may 
                                                     
156  ANAO Audit Report No.6 2007–08, Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza Pandemic, p. 106. 
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place  itself  in a  state of  standby  readiness,  conduct alert briefings with  state 
colleagues,  place  the warehouse  contractors  on  alert  and,  if  necessary,  then 
formally activate the National Incident Room (NIR).157  
5.17 A request for items from the Stockpile can be made through the NIR if 
it  is  formally  activated. A  request may  also  be made  via  phone  call  from  a 
state/territory CHO  to  the CMO,  to  the Office  of Health Protection  or  via  a 
dedicated phone  line. Where an  item  from  the Stockpile has been granted an 
exemption under the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989, approval must first be sought 





from  the  Stockpile  in  response  to  a  major  incident,  including  a  terrorist 
incident.  The  CMO  and  the  head  of  the  Office  of  Health  Protection  are 
members of this committee and would lead the department’s response through 
the NIR.  
5.19 Once  a  deployment  request  has  been  approved,  the  contracted 
warehouse providers are required to have the items for deployment ready for 
transport  within  six  hours  of  the  receipt  of  an  Official  Order  Form.  The 
transport  provider  then  delivers  the  items  to  the  nominated  jurisdictional 
receiving  site.  A  receiving  site  may,  for  example,  be  a  public  hospital  or 




the  items are used. The obligations of  the Commonwealth and  the  receiving 
state  or  territory,  regarding  the  receipt  and  safekeeping  of  the  items,  are 
outlined in the relevant MoUs.  
                                                     
157  Formal approval of the CMO is required to activate the NIR. 
158  The Australian Government Crisis Committee is the primary forum for coordinating the Australian 
Government’s response to a major incident including consolidating information and coordinating 
information exchange. The National Crisis Committee is the primary forum for coordinating a 
whole-of-government response to an incident of national significance, specifically a terrorist incident. 
159  These sites are nominated in advance by the jurisdictions, agreed to by the Department of Health and 
are recorded in the relevant MoUs. 
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Twenty-four hour access to the Stockpile 
5.21 The  Department  of  Health’s  Emergency  Management  Branch  has  a 
Duty  Officer  and  Watch  Officer  roster  system  than  monitors  all  calls  on  a 
dedicated phone line. The Duty Officer is the point of contact after hours. The 
ANAO examined  the response arrangements  for  the Watch Officer and Duty 
Officers. The Duty Officer, for example, is required to: not drink alcohol, have 




5.22 The  NIR  staff  rely  on  the  deployment  folder  for  information  on  the 
Stockpile  and  details  of  specific  stock  items.160  The  ANAO  examined  the 
deployment folder in July 2013 and again in August 2013, and it was not up to 
date.  In  the  July  2013  examination  of  the  deployment  folder:  six  out  of  25 
influenza items contained inaccuracies, in particular listing expired stock; and 
six out of 19 CBRN  items contained  inaccuracies,  in particular  listing expired 
stock. The August 2013 analysis  (comparing  stock  levels and amounts  in  the 
folder against the stocktake) also identified discrepancies in the counts and the 
items.  These  errors  make  the  deployment  folder  unreliable.  Following  the 
ANAO’s review of the deployment folder, the department advised that  it has 
updated  the  information  contained  in  the  deployment  folder,  and  has 
commenced  a  review  of  the  deployment  folder  business  processes. 
Maintaining an up‐to‐date deployment folder would strengthen the Stockpile’s 
deployment processes.  
Timeliness of deployment 
5.23 An  effective  deployment  from  the  Stockpile  requires  the  timely 
approval of a  jurisdictional request, selection of  the correct stock, dispatch of 
stock from a warehouse, and delivery of the stock to the jurisdiction’s receiving 
site.  The  department  has  developed  two  related  timeliness  standards  for 
deployment of Stockpile items, set out in the deployment plan, which states:  
If possible, medicines from the Stockpile should be delivered to the requesting 
jurisdiction within 24 hours of  receipt of  the deployment  request, or  sooner. 
Bulky  items  such  as  PPE  or  vaccination  packs  should  be  delivered  within 
                                                     
160  Department of Health, ‘National Medical Stockpile Deployment Procedures’, 13 December 2012, p.2. 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.53 2013–14 




maintain a capacity  to prepare NMS  [Stockpile]  items  for deployment on six 
hours notice.161  
5.24 The contract  for  the non‐pharmaceutical warehouse provider  requires 
the contractor (if using  its own transport) to deliver the goods to the relevant 
jurisdiction’s  receiving  site within  24 hours  after  receipt of  the official order 
form, to provide a track and trace capability for the consignment, and to notify 
the NIR immediately upon delivery. However, the pharmaceutical warehouse 
provider’s  contract  does  not  include  this  24  hour  delivery  timeframe  as  a 
requirement162, notwithstanding the 24 hour timeliness standard set out in the 
deployment plan and other departmental documents.163 
Reporting on timeliness of deployment 
5.25 The department’s  2011–12 Annual Report  listed  the  key performance 
indicator (KPI) for the Stockpile as the  ‘capacity for timely deployment of the 
National  Medical  Stockpile’  with  a  reference  point  ‘deployment  of  the 
Stockpile,  either  through  exercise  or  live  deployment,  meets  the  six‐hour 
response  time’.164 The 2010–11 Annual Report  reported against  the  same KPI 
for  the Stockpile and stated  that  the department undertook  five deployments 
from  the  Stockpile  in  2010–11  and  all  had  met  the  six‐hour  response 
benchmark.165 
5.26 The  2012–13 Annual Report  ceased  listing  the  six‐hour  response KPI. 
The department  informed  the ANAO  that  it had developed  its performance 
reporting at a higher, more strategic level which included removing the KPI for 
a six‐hour response. 
Deploying CBRN items 
5.27 The 2008 CBRN Review undertaken by  the department  identified  the 
need  to deploy CBRN antidotes within  short  time  frames and  recommended 
that where an item had to be delivered in less than 24 hours, consideration be 
given  to  pre‐positioning  the  item  within  the  jurisdiction  where  it  was 
                                                     
161  Department of Health, ‘National Medical Stockpile Deployment Plan’, December 2012, pp. 3–4. 
162  The Department of Health may engage a separate transport provider for deployment, or it may travel by 
air. 
163  Both warehouse contractors have established systems that enable dispatched goods to be tracked to 
the jurisdictional receiving site. 
164  Department of Health and Ageing, Annual Report 2011–12, 2012, p. 282. 
165  ibid., p. 329. 
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161  Department of Health, ‘National Medical Stockpile Deployment Plan’, December 2012, pp. 3–4. 
162  The Department of Health may engage a separate transport provider for deployment, or it may travel by 
air. 
163  Both warehouse contractors have established systems that enable dispatched goods to be tracked to 
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165  ibid., p. 329. 
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potentially  required.166  The  2008  CBRN  Review  identified,  for  example,  a 
poison antidote and recommended that it be held in all jurisdictions.167  
5.28 The  department  has  held  preliminary  discussions  with  state  health 
departments  about  potential  changes  to  stockpiling  arrangements  which 
would  involve  the  Commonwealth  taking  responsibility  for  providing  high 
risk, low use products (for example, CBRN response items and antivirals) and 
the states taking responsibility for low risk, high use items that could be cycled 
through  the  health  system  (for  example,  PPE  items).  Discussions  have  also 
been held about pre‐deploying  items with states  that  require delivery within 
relatively short timeframes. 




in:  March  2011  and  May  2011  (with  two  pre‐deployments  of  items  to  two 
Commonwealth government agencies in September 2012 and January 2013).168 




request  of  the NSW CHO,  to  be  used  by  its  ambulance  services  to  cover  a 
CBRN  item  normally  held  by  NSW  and  which  had  expired.169  The  items 
remain  the  property  of  the  Commonwealth,  and  the  Department  of  Health 




166  Pre-positioning CBRN items in several locations and not centrally has implications for the quantity of 
items required. 
167  Department of Health, ‘Final 2008 Review of the National Medical Stockpile’, November 2008,  
pp. 3,7,8 & 12. 
168  Pre-deployment refers to pre-positioning items to agencies, or states and territories, so that they are in 
place in advance of need. They remain Commonwealth property and are managed by the receiver. 
169  Pending completion of an order by NSW for the supply of the antidote. 
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Authorisation for deployment of Stockpile items 
5.31 Many of  the CBRN  items  in  the Stockpile are antidotes  for poisoning 
which  are  not  available  in  the  Australian  pharmaceutical  market,  and  are 
purchased by governments for use in response to terrorist or health threats. As 
such,  these  antidotes  are  not  approved  by  the  Therapeutic  Goods 
Administration  for  use  within  Australia.  The  department  purchases  such 
medicines  using  the  exemption  powers  of  the  Minister  for  Health,  or  the 
Minister’s delegate—the Secretary of  the Department of Health—under  s18A 
of the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (the TGA Act). 
5.32 As discussed, where  an  item  from  the Stockpile has been granted  an 
exemption under the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989, approval must first be sought 
from  the Secretary of Health  to deploy. An approval  to deploy an exempted 
item may also require a direction by the Secretary which sets conditions on the 
use,  storage  and  records  that must  be  kept.  This  approval must  be  granted 
before  administrative  approval  for  deployment  is  granted  by  the  CMO. 






The management of returned stock 
5.33 The 2011 Strategic Review of the Stockpile observed that there was not a 
recording mechanism that could accurately determine how returned stock was 
treated  after  deployment,  thereby  guaranteeing  its  condition  prior  to  its 
receipt.171 
5.34 The relevant Australian code172 requires that medicines which have left the 




170  Department of Health, National Health Emergency Response Arrangements, Australian Health 
Protection Committee, 2011, p. 16. 
171  Department of Finance, ‘Review of the National Medical Stockpile’, February 2011, Canberra, p. 9. 
172  Australian Code of Good Wholesaling Practice for Medicines in Schedules 2, 3, 4 and 8. 
173  National Coordinating Committee on Therapeutic Goods, Australian Code of Good Wholesaling Practice 
for Medicines in Schedules 2, 3, 4 and 8, 2011, p. 12.  
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170  Department of Health, National Health Emergency Response Arrangements, Australian Health 
Protection Committee, 2011, p. 16. 
171  Department of Finance, Review of the National Medical Stockpile, February 2011, Canberra, p. 9. 
172  Australian Code of Good Wholesaling Practice for Medicines in Schedules 2, 3, 4 and 8. 
173  National Coordinating Committee on Therapeutic Goods, Australian Code of Good Wholesaling Practice 
for Medicines in Schedules 2, 3, 4 and 8, 2011, p. 12.  
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warehouse providers are  required  to  follow  the code, and  if stockpile  items are 
returned,  they  must  first  place  them  in  ‘quarantine’—separated  from  other 
stockpile items—and contact the department for directions.  
5.35 The  MoUs  contain  guidance  on  the  return  of  deployed  stock  and 
require the relevant jurisdiction to provide advice to the department about any 
unused stockpile  items, and  information on how  the  items were stored while 




consideration  of  the  conditions  under which  the  item  had  been  transported 
and  stored  after  deployment  by  the  department.  Further,  the  item  was 
returned  to  the Stockpile a month  later without examination and assessment 






in complying with  relevant  requirements, should be assessed and  treatments 
considered, in the context of the operational risk management plan. 
Testing the deployment arrangements 
5.38 In  its  2007–08  report,  the ANAO  recommended  that  the  department 
review and adequately test its deployment plans in conjunction with the states 
and  territories.176  In 2006,  the department  tested  the deployment  readiness of 
the Stockpile  in  response  to a pandemic  through Exercise Cumpston. At  that 




174  See for example, Department of Health and Ageing, Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Commonwealth of Australia and the Northern Territory, in relation to the Receipt, Storage and Use of 
Pharmaceutical and Equipment Items from the National Medical Stockpile, 3 June 2010, pp. 12,13. 
175  A stock of antidote was deployed in September 2012 to a detention center for possible use. It was not 
used, but remained at the center until October 2012 when it was returned to the Stockpile. 
176  ANAO Audit Report No.6 2007–08, Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza Pandemic, 
Recommendation 4(b), p. 32. 
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jurisdictional  warehouses  was  an  effective  strategy,  particularly  for  large 
volumes of PPE items, which had reduced the distribution response time. The 
review observed that: 
Planned  arrangements,  including  transport,  for  distributions  of  NMS 
[Stockpile]  supplies  from  the  Australian  Government  to  jurisdictional 
receiving  facilities generally were effective and enabled  timely movement of 
consignments.180 
5.40 In  September  2012,  the department’s  audit  committee  considered  the 
department’s  progress  in  implementing  the  ANAO’s  2007–08 
recommendation,  with  regard  to  testing  the  deployment  plans.  The  audit 
committee noted that while there had been no testing between 2009 and 2012, 
testing  would  occur  in  late  2012  or  early  2013.  However,  the  department 
advised  the ANAO  that  it had not  tested deployment of  the Stockpile  in  the 
four years to February 2014. In effect, the deployment of the Stockpile has not 
been tested since the 2009 pandemic. The department also informed the ANAO 
that no  testing of  the deployment of CBRN  items had been conducted  in  the 
last  five  years. To  provide  assurance  that deployment  arrangements will  be 
effective  in  a  national  health  emergency,  the  department  should  undertake 
planning  to  test  the  current  Stockpile  deployment  arrangements,  in 
consultation with other jurisdictions.  
                                                     
177  House of Representatives: Standing Committee on Health and Ageing, Diseases Have No Borders: 
Report into the Inquiry into Health Issues across International Borders, Canberra, March 2013, p. 100.  
178  The first deployment occurred on 30 April 2009 and the last on 17 November 2009. 
179  Department of Health and Ageing, Review of Australia’s Health Sector Response to Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009: Lessons Identified, 2011, p. 55.  
180  ibid., p. 55. 
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177  House of Representatives: Standing Committee on Health and Ageing, Diseases Have No Borders: 
Report into the Inquiry into Health Issues across International Borders, Canberra, March 2013, p. 100.  
178  The first deployment occurred on 30 April 2009 and the last on 17 November 2009. 
179  Department of Health and Ageing, Review of Australia’s Health Sector Response to Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009: Lessons Identified, 2011, p. 55.  
180  ibid., p. 55. 
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Recommendation No.4  
5.41 To provide assurance that deployment arrangements will be effective in 
a national health emergency, the ANAO recommends that the Department of 







and  procedures;  and  relevant  provisions  in  contracts  with  the  Stockpile 
warehouse providers. The states and territories have also developed stockpile 
distribution plans, a specific requirement of the MoUs. All MoUs were current, 
having  been  updated  in  2010, with  the  requirement  for  a  review  every  five 
years. However,  the department held current distribution plans  for only  four 
of the eight jurisdictions, and there would be benefit in the department liaising 
with  jurisdictions  which  have  not  updated  their  plans,  to  address  this 
deficiency.  
5.44 The  department  advises  its  warehouse  providers  to  select  stock  for 
deployment which has not exceeded  its expiry date, and has adequate  stock 
life for at  least a month before  its expiry date. The PPE warehouse provider’s 
warehouse management  system  is  capable of  selecting unexpired  stock on  a 
First‐In,  First‐Out  (FIFO)  basis;  an  approach which  can  provide  an  effective 
basis  for  selecting unexpired  stock  for deployment. However,  the  efficacy of 
this  approach  can be  affected by  factors  such  as: not  all PPE  stock having  a 
recorded expiry date; the PPE warehouse provider’s FIFO date resetting when 
stock  is moved  from one warehouse  to another; data  integrity  issues  arising 
from  inconsistencies  between  the  department’s  information  management 
systems  and  warehouse  provider  data;  and  warehouse  providers  not 
consistently attaching to pallets labels that record expiry details.  
5.45 The 2011 Strategic Review of the Stockpile observed that there was ‘no 
recording mechanism  that  can accurately determine how  returned  stock was 
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returned  to  the  national  Stockpile,  indicated  weaknesses  in  a  number  of 
controls. There was no consideration of  the conditions under which  the  item 
had  been  transported  and  stored  after  deployment.  Further,  the  item  was 
returned  to  the Stockpile a month  later without examination and assessment 
by an authorised person as required by the Australian code.  
5.46 In  its 2007–08 audit, the ANAO recommended that the Department of 
Health  adequately  test  its  deployment  plans  in  conjunction with  states  and 
territories.  In  September  2012,  the department’s  audit  committee  considered 




of  pandemic  items  since  the  last  pandemic  in  2009.  The  department  also 
informed  the ANAO  that  no  testing  of  the deployment  of CBRN  items  had 
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Appendix 1: Agency Response 
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Appendix 2: Relevant recommendations from 2007–08 
ANAO audit report on Australia’s 
preparedness for a human influenza 
pandemic 
Recommendation No.2 
To  improve  the management  of  the National Medical  Stockpile,  the ANAO 
recommends  that  the Department  of Health  and Ageing  incorporate  into  its 
governance framework: 




To  improve  the management  of  the National Medical  Stockpile,  the ANAO 







To  improve  the  effectiveness  of  deployment  arrangements  for  the  National 
Medical Stockpile, the ANAO recommends that the Department of Health: 
(a) undertake  an  assessment  of  the  risks  associated  with  deploying  the 
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Better Practice Guides 
The following Better Practice Guides are available on the ANAO website: 
Administering Regulation  June 2014 
Implementing Better Practice Grants Administration  Dec. 2013 
Human Resource Management Information Systems: Risks and controls  June 2013 
Preparation of Financial Statements by Public Sector Entities  June 2013 
Public Sector Internal Audit: An investment in assurance and business 
improvement 
Sept. 2012 
Public Sector Environmental Management: Reducing the environmental 
impacts of public sector operations 
Apr. 2012 
Developing and Managing Contracts: Getting the right outcome, 
achieving value for money 
Feb. 2012 
Public Sector Audit Committees: Independent assurance and advice for 
chief executives and boards 
Aug. 2011 
Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities  Mar. 2011 
Strategic and Operational Management of Assets by Public Sector 
Entities: Delivering agreed outcomes through an efficient and optimal 
asset base 
Sept. 2010 
Planning and Approving Projects – an Executive Perspective: Setting the 
foundation for results 
June 2010 
Innovation in the Public Sector: Enabling better performance, driving new 
directions 
Dec. 2009 
SAP ECC 6.0: Security and control  June 2009 
Business Continuity Management: Building resilience in public sector 
entities 
June 2009 
Developing and Managing Internal Budgets  June 2008 
Agency Management of Parliamentary Workflow  May 2008 
Fairness and Transparency in Purchasing Decisions: Probity in Australian 
Government procurement 
Aug. 2007 
Implementation of Programme and Policy Initiatives: Making 
implementation matter 
Oct. 2006 
 
  
 
  
 

